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A New Model of Sovereignty in the
Contemporary Era of Integrated
Global
Commerce:
What
Anthropology Contributes to the
Shortcomings of Legal Scholarship
Kevin B. Sobel-Read, JD, PhD*
ABSTRACT

Existing legal scholarship does not offer an effective or
comprehensive definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty, however,
matters. Indeed, many have lived and died for it; the term
likewise appears with remarkable frequency in both academic
and popular discourse.But, sovereignty is not what it used to be.
The evolution of globalizationgenerally, and transformationsin
global commerce specifically, have sutured together the peoples of
the world-conventional nation-states and Indigenous groups
alike-permanently altering the sovereignty of each. These
developments make it that much more imperative to incorporate
a functional definition of sovereignty into legal scholarship.But,
given the complexities of sovereignty, the tools of law alone are
insufficient to generate such a definition. Here anthropology
provides a unique and powerful insight to supplement those
shortcomings.An evidence-based model through the collaborative
lenses of law and anthropology shows that sovereignty and
culture have become fused in a mechanism driven by the
regulation of cross-border capital. This model empowers the
policy makers of conventional states and Indigenous groups to
more explicitly, efficiently, and effectively integrate different
forms of value-both economic and social.

* Kevin B. Sobel-Read, JD, PhD is a Lecturer at the Newcastle Law School,
University of Newcastle, Australia. This Article has benefitted from excellent
supplemental research performed by Katie Thompson. For invaluable insight and
support, the author thanks Cook Islands Secretary of Justice Tingika Elikana, Jean
Mason, Cook Islands Police Commissioner Maara Tetava, Sylvia Marsters, Jacqui
Teaukura, and Kura Blizzard, as well as Mack O'Barr, Anne Allison, John Conley,
Michael Hardt, and Orin Starn; and most important of all: Ali, Lopa Lelei Nolan and
Tavake Tessa. Meitaki maata. Kia orana e kia manuia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereignty matters. One need only flip through a contemporary
publication to see the prevalence of the term within popular and
scholarly discourses alike. Issues of nation-state sovereignty permeate
debates on topics that are as far-ranging as they are contradictory,
including independence movements, the European Union, trade
agreements, the Internet, Indian casinos, and U.S. military drone
strikes. So the importance of sovereignty is doubly evident,
demonstrated by both the frequency of its use and the significance of
the issues that inspire that use. More importantly, sovereignty matters
because it is meaningful to people-indeed, countless many have died
for it and many more continue to.
Sovereignty, however, is not what it used to be. Changes in the
global political economy are currently transforming the nature and the
role of sovereignty into a novel phenomenon, distinct from previous
forms and philosophies. In short, two-thirds of all transnational trade
is now conducted by multi-national corporations. I This global
commerce is systemically binding the peoples of the world together in
unprecedented ways. Gone are the days when the majority of crossborder commerce was comprised of arms-length, country-to-country
transactions involving a simple exchange of money for finished
products. Instead, what characterizes global commerce today is the
increasingly systemic nature of the collaboration among companies in
a supply chain. This systemic nature weaves together bodies of lawranging from contractual components to regulatory and enforcement
2
mechanisms-from multiple jurisdictions.
A relevant and functional definition of sovereignty is therefore
central to the study of law. By its very nature, the concept of
sovereignty invokes relationships between two or more groups. Today,
when global trade exceeds $23 trillion annually, 3 these relationships
are grounded in the commerce of the global market. Law-typically,
state law-is the framework through which this integrative commerce
takes place: each of the constitutive cross-border transactions
implicates the national legal frameworks of at least two states. At the
same time, every such transaction necessarily diminishes the
authority of one-and usually both-of the states by placing some of

1.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), WORLD TRADE REPORT (2014)
http://wto.org/english/res efbooksp.e/ world-trade-reportl4_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2016) [https://perma.cc/9V35-LQ9Q] (archived Sept. 3, 2016).
2.
Effective global commerce therefore requires two simultaneous processes: the
integration of multiple legal regimes by the parties-by means of contract or corporate
agreement-as well as the structuring of those legal regimes by the relevant states in
such a way as to make that integration possible.
3.
See WTO, supra note 1.
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the legal control over the transaction in the other, or largely outside of
the two altogether.
Existing legal scholarship, however, offers neither an effective nor
a comprehensive definition of sovereignty. This omission, of course, has
consequences for conventional nation-states. Moreover, given that
goods and money are continuously passing back and forth across all
borders, Indigenous peoples around the world are equally implicated
in these changing global dynamics. Indeed, this Article suggests that
conventional sovereignty and Indigenous sovereignty are, for the first
time in history, the same thing; stated differently, any usable model of
sovereignty today must encompass both Indigenous and conventional
4
notions of "sovereignty" equally.
Furthermore, because of these dramatic shifts in the global
political economy, legal scholarship cannot simply turn to the
traditional definitions of sovereignty found in other disciplines; those
definitions are now also outdated and insufficient. Many existing
definitions from other disciplines likewise suffer from the limiting
deficiency of an overly quantitative methodology. 5 Sovereignty is more
complex than quantitative means can measure. We are, after all,
human; sovereignty, like the globalization that has given rise to it, is a
system that affects people just as much as it is a system that was
created by people. And here the field of anthropology is essential: the
ability of anthropology to reach the human element in these regards
makes it both unique and powerful. In particular, anthropology is able
to fill in the gaps on sovereignty that legal scholarship cannot reach on
its own.
My own work on these matters-as a legal scholar, former
business-defense litigator, and anthropologist-has provided me with
a point of view that is multifaceted and distinct from any single
discipline. Building on extensive fieldwork in several countries, I bring
a broader methodology to the question of sovereignty and a novel
spectrum of tools on its exposition and modeling. In an evidence-based
analysis, this Article lays out my conclusions of that methodology and
modeling. For reasons to be explained, I use the small nation-state of
the Cook Islands as a detailed example of the concepts discussed. That
I rely on this young, vibrant polity is no accident. Rather, the country
serves as a productive subject of analysis: as both an independent

Therefore, for the remainder of this Article, unless stated otherwise, where I
4.
use "nation-state" and "state" I likewise refer to Indigenous groups and their governing
bodies.
5.
See Jeffrey Rachlinkski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 910
(2011) ("The point of evidence-based law is not to produce a set of empirical papers that
we academics can present to each other at conferences. The point is to create better lawlaw informed by reality.").
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nation-state and an Indigenous former
representational of the model here proposed.

colony,

it

is

firmly

The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses why sovereignty
today is different from all previous forms. It explains the background
forces that have transformed global commerce, focusing first on
globalization, which is the sine qua non of contemporary sovereignty.
It then examines the ongoing shift from global supply chains into socalled global value chains, a process that is suturing together the states
of the world. Part III describes the Cook Islands, placing the country
in the context of these changing global conditions. On this foundation,
Part IV then lays out a new model of sovereignty, with an aim both to
reflect the current condition and to shed light on a vast array of actions,
ranging from local decisions to global alliances. Throughout, examples
from the Cook Islands provide supporting evidence. Part V follows up
with a discussion of ways that this model integrates conventional and
Indigenous notions of sovereignty, including responses to anticipated
critiques. Part VI is a brief conclusion.
It should be noted that stepping into the flood of literature on the
concept of "sovereignty" is not without resistance or risk. The frequency
with which the word is used is remarkable. Nevertheless, in spite of
the abundant invocation of the term, most existing usage is subject to
one of two serious flaws. On the one hand, some authors begin with an
ideal definition of "sovereignty" as essentially "full control without any
outside influence whatsoever. '6 But, when applied to the contemporary
situation where all states are subject to at least some outside influence
or incursion, the only conclusion that can follow for such authors is that
sovereignty has been "abrogated," "eroded," or even "lost." 7 These

6.
See Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT'L
AFF. 353, 358 (1995) (discussing, among others, the theories of Jean Bodin and Thomas
Hobbes).
7.
E.g., C. Raj Kumar: Corruption,Human Rights, and Development: Sovereignty
and State Capacity to Promote Good Governance, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 416, 41718 (2005) ("Sovereignty is further eroded when the internal governance structures in a
society get gradually influenced by laws, policies, and practices of other states as officials
attempt to justify a certain conduct in such comparative terms."); Martin Flaherty,
Rights, Reality, and Utopia, FORDHAM L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2004) ("As scholars such as
Peter Spiro have argued, national sovereignty has eroded not just in the fact of
transnational organization, but also because local units of self-government have attained
renewed importance both domestically and internationally." (citing Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the (ForeignAffairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 667-71, 71725 (2002)); Edmund L Andrews, U.S. Rebuked: Slapping the Hand That
Fed Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/01/world/
us-rebuked-slapping-the-hand-that-fed-free-trade.html (subscription required)
[https://perma.cc/7858-JRVT] (archived Sept. 6, 2016) ("But perhaps the most startling
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truisms are of little value. Other commentators, on the other hand,
dilute the term by invoking it in any narrow instance where state
power is concerned, such as the suggestion that the practice of the U.S.
military to fly unpiloted drones "violates" the "sovereignty" of, say,
Pakistan.8 Here, of course, the flying of unpiloted drones-when flown
without the permission of the Pakistani state-represents a violation
of something (more generally, Pakistan's rules regarding the conditions
for machines to operate in its airspace, and, more specifically,
Pakistan's agreements with the United States regarding permissible
activity within its borders). But it is entirely unclear why that
something would be "sovereignty," especially since Pakistan allows
U.S. military operatives to perform at least some other actions within
its territory. 9
In short, the concept of sovereignty has been abused. The term has
been misunderstood, mistreated, and often rendered meaningless.
Some have even suggested eliminating it altogether. 10 This Article
aims to save both the term and the concept, for three reasons. First,
the bare word is important to many; indeed, many have died for it. As

twist in a tangled relationship came on Friday, when the World Trade Organization in
Geneva ruled that the European Union can impose up to $4 billion in penalties on the
United States because its tax break for exporters amounts to an illegal subsidy under
international law ....
Conservative critics charged that the panel had eroded American
sovereignty and had stepped far outside its authority.").
8.
E.g., Dawood Ahmed, Rethinking Anti-Drone Legal Strategies: Questioning
Pakistani and Yemeni "Consent",8 YALE J. INT'LAFF. 1, 3 (2013) ("The use of drones in
Pakistan remains particularly contentious ... Ben Emmerson QC, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, argued that U.S. drone
strikes did indeed violate Pakistan's sovereignty because he could not find any record of
the Pakistan government having given consent."); Salman Masood & Ismail Khan,
Pakistan Says U.S. Drone Strike Kills 4, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/world/asia/pakistan-says-us-drone-strike-kills4.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/5MWW-5PAV] (last visited June 6,
2016) ("Drone strikes by the United States are deeply resented in the country and seen
as a breach of Pakistani sovereignty.").
9.
See Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan,the Law of
War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, INT'L J. Bus. & L. 10, 13 (2011) ("So close are
the ties between the [countries], the U.S. and Pakistan have established 'fusion centers'
in Pakistan to aid in sharing information regarding the drone strikes. The United States
and Pakistan continue to foster this 'partnership,' in terms of aid as well as strategy
against common enemies."); Mehran Gul, U.S. National Security Strategy: Managing
Strategic Partnershipin South Asia, 4 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 72, 83 (2009) ("In the run up to
the war, Pakistan provided the United States with blanket flyover and landing rights,
access to naval and air bases, fuel supplies, logistical support, and access to Pakistan's
ports to supply troops to landlocked Afghanistan. All this material support was provided
without any formal agreements or fees normally required for such privileges. During the
war, Pakistan made two-third of its air space available for coalition operations,
suspending its own civilian and military usage of the airspace.").
10. See generally Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,
and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999); Louis Henkin, Human
Rights and State "Sovereignty" 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31 (1995/199f6).
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such, it is a rallying cry, an ideal, a hope, and a goal, in ways that no
neologism could capture. That alone should be reason enough to push
us to make better sense of the concept, however elusive, that the term
encapsulates. Second, as noted, the term is, in both academia and
popular media, seemingly ubiquitous. Given the noteworthy frequency
of usage, and in spite of any potential linguistic inventions by
academics, the term is not about to disappear from discourse. It should
consequently be retained, but with clarity and purpose. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, especially given this common usage, it is
imperative to be aware that, each time it is invoked, the term
"sovereignty" obscures the real issues in question, which are in part
issues of function, but, most significantly, are issues of power. In other
words, any invocation of "sovereignty" necessarily entails relationships
between two or more groups of people; by misunderstanding
"sovereignty" one misunderstands the relationships of power between
those particular groups and therefore can be misled into discussingand fighting for-the wrong (in various senses of the word) matters.
II. SOVEREIGNTY TODAY Is DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT HAS
EVER BEEN BEFORE

Existing theories of sovereignty vary widely. In a Hobbesian vein,
early absolutist articulations of sovereignty proclaim that 'either a
state is sovereign, in which case it cannot be bound by any law higher
than its own, or it is bound by law, in which case it ceases to be
sovereign."' 11 Max Weber likewise described the sovereignty of the
state as "that agency within society which possesses the monopoly of
12
legitimate violence.'
Sovereignty, however, is an ad hoc solution to a particular set of
historically and contextually emerging dilemmas. Thus, as the
dilemmas have continued to change, so too have the solutions. More
recent commentators have therefore updated those earlier definitions,
often referring to sovereignty as a form of "constitutional or legal

11. Philip M. Nichols, Integrated Sovereignty 10 (Apr. 23, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (https://works.bepress.com/philip-nichols/3/download/
[https://perma.cc/
7AC6-K9VY] (archived Sept. 27, 2016)).
12.

ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE

PAST 3 (2d ed. 2006). Weber's central focus on violence may now be outdated too, but this
general idea continues in other guises, such as for Perry, for whom "Such power to define
and punish crime is centrally constitutive of the meaning of sovereignty." Richard
Warren Perry, Native American Tribal Gaming as Crime Against Nature: Environment,
Sovereignty, Globalization,POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 110, 110 (2006). See also
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY (1st ed. 1985); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND
BARE LIFE (1998).
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independence. '13 Indeed, in these terms sovereignty was, following the
Treaty of Westphalia, "the cornerstone of the international legal order
'14
for at least three-and-one-half centuries.
At the same time, there has been articulate post-colonial critique
of these theories. Antony Anghie, for instance, explains that
colonialism "was not an example of the application of sovereignty;
rather sovereignty was constructed through colonialism." 15 Other
commentators have gone so far as to argue that "sovereignty" is in fact
a Western concept ill-suited to Indigenous realities: 16 "Sovereignty
itself implies a set of values and objectives that put it in direct
opposition to the values and objectives found in most traditional
17
indigenous philosophies."

These theories, of which there are myriad variations, are
inconsistent.1 8 More importantly, none adequately captures the reality
of the contemporary era. So, with these outdated yet lingering lessons
as a launching pad, this Article starts with three basic premises that I
take to be widely acceptable. First, the concept of sovereignty in
isolation is meaningless. That is to say, sovereignty is only meaningful
in relation to other sovereignties. Second, no state today is
independent. The dependence of states can be of many forms and
scopes, but such interdependence is always and inevitably a
constituent element of contemporary statehood. And third, economic
rationality is always refracted. By this I mean that any tendency that
human beings have to maximize wealth is invariably influenced by the

13. Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in the
Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 487 (1999).
14. Id. Hannum makes the interesting point that the Treaty of Westphalia
replaced a hierarchical structure (based on the Pope and Roman Empire) with a
horizontal one.
15.
Antony Anghie,
IMPERIALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (2004).

SOVEREIGNTY

AND

THE

MAKING

OF

16. Michael F. Brown, Sovereignty's Betrayals, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE TODAY
171, 178 (Marisol de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007) (building on the ideas of Vine
Deloria Jr. and Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred).
17. Id. (quoting Taiaiake Alfred).
18. As just one example, compare Philpott, supra note 6, at 357 (recognizing
"internal," "external," "absolute," and "non-absolute" aspects of sovereignty) with Robert
Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, 1 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 105, 107 (1907) (defining
"sovereignty in its broadest sense as the power to do all things without accountability.
So extensive a power, which eliminates the elements of time and space, of motion and
inertia, of mind and matter, can only find a counterpart in a super-mundane and superhuman sovereignty which is coextensive with the limitless universe and which can only
be possessed by an Omnipotent and Eternal Being. Sovereignty in the abstract is,
therefore, coincident with Divine Sovereignty.") (emphasis in original).
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cultural lens through which they view that wealth, which includes the
ways that members of that group can compete for wealth and the
different kinds of power that that wealth represents for them.
Several consequences follow from the constructive combination of
the above three premises. First, because sovereignty cannot exist in
isolation but only in relation to other sovereignties, the concepts of
"sovereignty" and "globalization," even when subject to debates about
definitional nuance, must be mutually constitutive. Second, because
economic
rationality is always inflected by non-economic
interpretations and interests (even though there is decidedly argument
about the degree), the economic policies taken by states must also
always be subject to at least some variation. Thus, regardless of one's
theory of global interaction, the many states of the world cannot be
reduced to one economic model; instead, the key for understanding any
state must be the interface between that state and the global market.
And third, because no state is today fully independent, whether
economically or culturally, and because the global market is, to a great
extent, the structural link between states' dependences, the concept
called "sovereignty" must be each state's strategic management of its
interface with the global market. Further, this strategic management
must necessarily be driven by efforts to balance the compromises that
are necessary for participation in the global market with the protection
of certain, locally meaningful, and often non-economically rational,
interests.19 Contemporary state sovereignty then must be made up of
both (1) uniform elements that allow the sovereignty in the form of the
state to interface, that is, to do business with other sovereignties, and
(2) subjective elements, related to local interests (some might say
"culture"), that are largely unique to each state.
These factors will be discussed in detail below, but some
background is necessary. The remainder of this Part will lay out the
factors that have caused contemporary sovereignty to become what it
is today: first, in a broader, deeper sense is globalization itself; second,
within that framework are the specific changes to the form and
function of global commerce that are triggered by so-called global value
chains.
A. Globalization
Globalization and sovereignty are mutually constitutive-they
create each other. To understand sovereignty, therefore, one must first

19. As should become clear, law and sovereignty are consequently inseparable
concepts. In the contemporary world, however, it is not sovereignty that makes law
possible, but instead law that makes sovereignty possible.
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make sense of the network of sovereignties that is the essence of our
contemporary moment: globalization.
The term "globalization" itself is powerful, almost magical.
Bubbling forth from within its linguistic composition are both the
expansive brilliance of the "globe-" and the tool, the function, the
perennial action of the "-ization." It is a word whose treasured syllables
roll off the tongue--or from the scholar's quick keystrokes-often with
no context, a floating signifier inspiring far-ranging images of
modernity, technology, and disparate places. Indeed, the word is so
filled with meaning that its meaning is frequently lost; it is
overdetermined, evoking a connectedness that, in some moments, like
in the smiles of the transnational tourists' photographs, is as subtle as
it is beautiful, and, in others, as in the forlorn faces of desperate
migrants, is a sheer horror. But whatever the case, whatever its
contours, one thing is clear: globalization is.
As I write these very phrases, I take stock, and after just a few
seconds note to myself that I am sitting in the United States while
mechanics attend to my aging Swedish car. I am drinking coffee from
Indonesia from a cup purchased in New Zealand while I listen to music
recorded in Australia, but downloaded in the United States, through
Japanese headphones made in China. I could go on, but what's the
point? None of this is surprising: globalization is everywhere.
On the one hand, this everywhereness is a crucial descriptor of
globalization; but on the other hand, such a description is incomplete
and misleading. Indeed, human beings are surrounded by, and form
intimate relationships with, products from the global marketplace,
from cell phones to clothes to wedding rings to teddy bears. But global
things are not only around us: given that we eat and drink foodstuffs
that are grown and processed globally, global things are also in us,
consumed into our physical being. More important even than this
around-ness and this in-ness is the fact that, just as we are a part of
globalization, globalization has become a part of us; globalization is
now an integral part of our view of the world, it is a fundamental,
intrinsic, and inextricable element of our formation as subjects, of our
sense of self.
Globalization tends to be associated with modernity, or perhaps,
post-modernity. Both terms, however, reflect that globalization is here
now; it is the era of today. But, as Eric Wolf and others have made
clear, the current network of international connectedness is only the
latest of many globalizations that have linked distanced and disparate
human cultures together for millennia. 20

20.
See, e.g., ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY (1997);
ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION
(1996); Anna Tsing, The Global Situation, 15 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 327 (2000).
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The difference is that contemporary globalization is not simply the
mass movement of people and goods, just as it is more than the mutual
dependence of international economies or the connections of distant
peoples via media and communications technologies. Instead,
"globalization," as a descriptor of our contemporary world, is a dynamic
and sui generis combination of these factors. So while other eras of
globalization have come and gone, in various forms, the present form
is unique and can only be understood by recognizing any moment or
21
event as a confluence of these factors.
More precisely, contemporary globalization is divisible into four
related and inter-connected elements. First, globalization is about
nation-states and the relationships between them. Nation-states, of
course, interface with the global community and the global
marketplace in different ways. 22 An examination of globalization must
accordingly interrogate the range of these ways of interfacing.
Second, globalization is not simply the connections among states
but is also a matter of the movement of each state's citizens, and so is
likewise about people (whether as laborers or as consumers of labor's
production, or both). As such, one must investigate the ways in which
the movement of individuals, both out of states and into states, links
states and sub-state groups, from regions to families.
Third, capital, as well as goods (produced objects), plays an
integral role in globalization. Sometimes globalization is thought of as
the movement of goods across borders, but that is inadequate; in
reality, globalization is about the co-production of goods-the fact that
materials and labor from multiple global locations are required for the

21.
See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 8 (2000) ("Many contemporary
theorists are reluctant to recognize the globalization of capitalist production and its
world market as a fundamentally new situation and a significant historical shift.").
22.

Not only is the state itself an essential component of globalization, but the

functions of the state are also of course driven by humans who reproduce their
relationship with globalization in their management of the state.
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production and transportation of essentially every produced object on
24
the planet. 23 Global flows of capital underpin this co-production.
Fourth, globalization is about the individual. Globalization in the
contemporary world is linked to the individual in several ways: (1)
Given the globalization of foodstuffs, some part of most people's diet is
imported. The human body itself thereby becomes part of globalization
in its most physical form, inseparable from it. 25 (2) Given that
essentially all products are co-produced through globalization,
humans' use of just about every thing connects an individual to
globalization and the global networks of relationships. Even a chair
carved from local wood will likely have been, even if nothing else, at
least transported by some mechanized means, in which case tires,
engines, fuel, et cetera, link the vehicle, and thereby the chair, to
globalization. (3) Not only is nearly every individual aware of the global
community, as well as of the global market (even if not in such terms),
but every individual is also affected by the processes of international
movement,
interdependent
economies,
and
planet-wide
communication technologies. Globalization is therefore more than the
mappable infrastructure and quantifiable processes themselves;
globalization is equally so the ways that the patterns of this
infrastructure and the reverberations of these processes become
reproduced in individual subject formation, in the understandings of
self As a result, globalization is not merely a set of circumstances,

23.
More precisely, by co-production I mean that every nation-state is implicated
in the production of nearly every manufactured product. In short, any given productwhether sofa or microwave or light bulb-will usually require raw materials from the
lands of multiple nation-states. Even if not, the tools necessary to extract whatever raw
materials are needed to make the product will likely come from different locations
around the globe. And in any event, the factory and machinery used to
assemble/paint/package the goods will be made of materials from across the world. And
in each of these instances, labor in multiple countries-and/or laborers from multiple
countries-will almost surely have been involved. And then, any mechanized
transportation of the goods themselves will have been in vehicles-whether trucks
and/or trains and/or ships-each of which will be comprised of hundreds if not thousands
of component parts, each of which will be made up of raw materials that could be from
any number of countries and each of which, to be extracted, will have required labor in
any number of countries and each of which will have been touched by tools from any
number of countries, all transported on vehicles using fuel from any number of countries,
which may itself have been transported on a ship that has a crew from any number of
countries.., the list goes on and on and on, implicating more and more and more nationstates at each point along the way, until all have been included. Every manufactured
good is from everywhere.
24.
Note that in Peircean terms globalization has an indexical relationship to all
produced objects and to all individuals.
25.
Here too, if a given food stuff is from a foreign location, then foreign labor is
also implicated, as well as the elements of globalization present in the transportation of
such stuff, whether vehicles, component parts, fuel, oil, and all the labor and
transportation that went into those.
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conditions, and relationships, but is, like "modernity," a way of being
and a means of engaging with and experiencing the world.
B. The Role of Global Commerce
As recognized recently by an array of institutions-including the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development 26-global value chains are
transforming the way that international business operates. 27 Recall
that two-thirds of the $23 trillion in global trade is conducted by multinational corporations. 28 But it is no longer the case that multinational
corporations-whether individually or through one-to-one supplier
relationships--create, manufacture, and sell a given product on their
own.29 Instead, the research, design, production, and retail of most
products are now performed through coordinated chain components
that stretch systemically across multiple firms-ranging from a few to
a few thousand.3 0 It is not only these newly systemic chains themselves
that are designated by the term "global value chain," but also the shifts
in the global political economy that they represent. Indeed, these
transformed business practices are demanding that law take a novel
role in structuring international business and the relationships that

26. E.g., OECD, WTO, AND WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 12-20 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/tad/gvc-report g20-july-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XVJ8-MTU8]
(archived Sept. 6, 2016); see also Gary Gereffi, A Global Value Chain Perspective On
Industrial Policy And Development In Emerging Markets, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L.
433, 434 (2014) ("The global value chain (GVC) framework has evolved from its academic
origins to become a major paradigm used by a wide range of international organizations,
such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Labor
Organization (ILO), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).").
27. E.g., John Humphrey & Hubert Schmitz, Inter-Firm Relationships in Global
Value Chains: Trends in Chain Governance and Their Policy Implications, 1 INT'L. J.
TECH. LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 258 (2008); Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of
Global Value Chains, 12 REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 78, 92-94 (2005); Raphael Kaplinsky,

Spreading the Gains from Globalization: What Can Be Learned from Value-Chain
Analysis?, 47 PROBS. OF ECON. TRANSITION 74 (2004).

28. WTO, supra note 1.
29. E.g., GARY GEREFFI & KARINA FERNANDEZ-STARK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
ANALYSIS:
A PRIMER
2,
8
(2011),
http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-0531_GVC-analysis-a primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MY9-C8HA] (archived Sept. 27,
2016).
30.
E.g., Cattaneo et al., Joining, Upgrading and Being Competitive in Global
Value Chains:A Strategic Framework 3-5 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 6406,
2013).
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sustain it. As I have argued elsewhere, 31 legal scholarship has been
32
slow to adapt to these evolving changes.
The symbiotic connections between law and international
business-in the form of these global value chains-are likewise
essential to understanding contemporary sovereignty. As previously
stated, the phenomenon of globalization is not new. 33 Rather, human
groups have for millennia moved and interacted across vast distances.
This interaction has been stimulated by various catalysts, ranging
from trade and religion to war and hunger. 34 Even in relatively recent
times there have been periods of great social and economic interaction
across vast swaths of the planet, including the years prior to World
War I, which were characterized by elaborate and well-functioning
35
networks of international commerce.
The present era, however, is both quantitatively and qualitatively
distinct from those that have come before it. For one, the sheer volume
of current global commerce is unprecedented. More important than the
simple volume of trade, however, is the extent of the integration of that
trade: the economies of the nation-states of the world are now
interdependent; the same is true of their sovereignties.
The idiosyncrasies of global commerce in the contemporary era
have their roots in a series of significant technological advances. First
among these was the industrial innovation in the early decades of the
twentieth century that allowed a handful of corporations to maximize
both efficiency and economies of scale. Anchored in manufacturing,
these corporations reached substantial and previously unparalleled
sizes by capitalizing on these technological advances to mass-produce
goods. These early giant corporations were typically organized on a
model of vertical integration. That is to say, the corporation itself
tended to own all of the business units necessary to produce the
product.
Throughout the 1900s, advances in the transportation industry
facilitated the shipment of finished products and made it more feasible
to obtain component materials and parts from ever greater distances.
Of particular relevance in this regard was the invention and
subsequent standardization of the shipping container, which

31.

Kevin Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5

TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 364 (2014).

32. For an insightful exception, see IGLP LAW AND GLOBAL PRODUCTION WORKING
GROUP, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains:A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV.
INT'L L. 57 (2016).
33.
See infra Section II.A.
34. E.g., WOLF, supra note 20.
35.
See Stewart Firth, The Pacific Islands and the Globalization Agenda, 12
CONTEMP. PAC. 178, 179 (2000).
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drastically lowered the cost of global shipping while increasing
36
efficiency.
In the 1980s, this continuum of technological advances reached a
new milestone: innovations in communications technology made it
possible, for the first time, to achieve real-time communication
between most points on the planet. These developments had profound
effects on global commerce by unlocking previously impractical
pathways and relationships. Simultaneously, the 1980s saw the rise of
ideologies of free trade that took hold in many of the powerful nations
around the world. These ideologies caused a range of governments to
lower the legal barriers to the transportation of goods across borders.
In sum, by the end of the 1980s, the physical means to cheaply and
efficiently ship goods globally were well-established: communication
technology had made it possible to manage these shipments-as well
as any relevant pre- and/or post-shipment processes-in real time, and
governments were continuing to lower trade barriers so that
transnational shipments could be made with diminishing legal-and
therefore also economic-restraint.
These combined factors
transformed the landscape on which business could operate. In short,
they opened the world's labor markets to foreign companies'
production, and, subsequently, service needs.
Developed-country corporations responded through two key
processes: outsourcing and offshoring. Outsourcing refers to what is
called the dis-integration of business units. 37 Recall that, until this
time, business units were typically vertically integrated, meaning that
a single corporation would usually own the relevant business units
necessary for production-the corporation performed most of its work,
from research and development to assembly, in-house. In outsourcing,
by contrast, the corporation contracts with other, outside firms for the
completion of some of the tasks necessary for production, rather than
performing them on its own. These tasks can include core production

36.
MARK LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (1st ed. 2008); Kevin P Maney: "Said To

Contain" Fear of Incurring Liability Creates a Disincentive for Cargo Carriers To
Improve Shipping Container Security by Examining Cargo, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 317, 31920 (2010) ("Developed in the 1950s, the container has not only changed the logistics of
the movement of goods, but it has also contributed to the creation of the global economy.
The shipping container has dramatically reduced freight costs, spurring the expansion
of domestic companies into global companies, and cut transport time to such an extent
that businesses have revamped inventory systems ....
With the fall of the cost of
shipping came an increase in the number of companies that began to expand into more
markets and develop global supply chains. Not only were companies able to market and
ship globally, but also production of goods became horizontal rather than vertical.").
37. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contractingfor Innovation: Vertical Disintegrationand
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 436-37 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et
al., Contractingfor Innovation].
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elements, such as the provision of components, or even assembly itself,
as well as a range of auxiliary elements, including advertising,
accounting, and legal services. 38 In many situations, outsourcing offers
significant efficiency benefits: on the one hand, the corporation can
contract upward or downward as its needs ebb and flow, rather than
maintaining a constant staff; and, on the other hand, firms that
specialize-whether in design or legal services-can focus on core
strengths, often with greater expertise and innovation.
Offshoring, by extension, is the process by which corporations
outsource given tasks to other firms specifically in foreign
jurisdictions.3 9 The production of goods and components in China is a
basic example. The underlying reasons for offshoring tend, of course,
to be cost: the production of a given component in a developing country
is often much less expensive than production in a developed country,
even taking into account transportation and coordination costs. These
lower costs derive primarily from cheaper labor. However, wage is not
the only factor: looser environmental regulations and harsher working
conditions also increase production in relation to cost.
This combination of outsourcing and offshoring gave birth to
global supply chains: as Western companies sought cheaper and
cheaper sources of labor, they spread farther and farther into the
world, often using intermediaries to manage the transactions. At the
same time, production itself became ever more fractured, with more
components being produced in more locations. In tandem, supply
40
chains grew in length and complexity.
This era was still, however, dominated by one-to-one
relationships, that is, global supply chains were largely characterized
by many series of arms-length transactions. But from the 1990s and
into the 2000s, these global supply chains transformed into a novel
phenomenon: global value chains. 41 Unlike the separate link-to-link
nature of global supply chains, global value chains are marked by a

38. Note here that old American dream story of the teenager who starts as a clerk
in the mailroom of magnificent and monolith Company X but then climbs the corporate
ladder to one day become head of the company. That dream story is only possible in a
world where the mailroom clerks are necessarily employees of Company X in the first
place. Today, with outsourcing, it is just as likely that such clerks are not employees of
Company X but rather of an outside agency with whom Company X contracts to manage
its mailroom services. The American dream, in this regard at least, has lost the plot.
39.
See GEREFFI & FERNANDEZ-STARK, supra note 29, at 18.
40.
See, e.g., Radu Mares, The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility: A Critical
Analysis of Corporate Responsibility Instruments, 79 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 193, 194 n.7
(2010) (explaining that the number of suppliers for some multi-national corporations can
reach the "thousands and even tens of thousands").
41. E.g., GEREFFI & FERNANDEZ-STARK, supra note 29, at 8.

20.16]

A NEW MODEL OF SOVEREIGNTY

fusion of the links: in form and function,4 2global value chains are
increasingly systemic, integrated processes.
There are four main causes of this transformation. The first is
efficiency. Regardless of industry, price serves as one possible source
of competitive advantage for firms, 43 and, as noted, offshoring and
outsourcing can certainly lead to cost savings. But whatever
competitive advantage might be gained in these regards can be lost
when all competitors similarly offshore and outsource their services,
procurement, and production. Moreover, competition among firms in a
given sector has escalated in recent years, minimizing the ability of
retailers and manufacturers to accept narrower profit margins for the
sake of lower selling prices. 44 Thus, as lead firms have become aware,
an important and often necessary way to reduce costs further is to
improve the efficiency of the entire supply chain. 4 5 In this process, lead
firms often possess knowledge that can assist suppliers in enhancing
efficiency, but lead firms are hesitant to share commercially sensitive
knowledge without assurances that the supplier will remain loyal. The
result implicates two levels of chain integration: on the one hand, lead
firms become more involved in the day-to-day activities of their
suppliers in order to help those suppliers become more efficient; on the
other hand, lead firms are requiring suppliers to commit to longer,
46
more complex relationships.
Second, either instead of or in addition to price-based factors,
another competitive advantage can be achieved by means of so-called
differentiation. 47 Here the selling point of a given good relates to some

42. See Kaplinsky, supra note 27, at 87; Fabrizio Cafaggi et al., Accessing the
Global Value Chain in a Changing InstitutionalEnvironment: ComparingAeronautics
and Coffee 5 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. IDB-WP-370, 2012),
http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/11680.pdf
[https://perma.cc/353Q-G3R3]
(archived Sept. 3, 2016); Fabrizio Cafaggi, Private Regulation, Supply Chain and
ContractualNetworks: The Case of Food Safety 4 (Robert Schuman Centre For Advanced
Stud., Working Paper No. RSCAS 2010/10, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554329
[https://perma.cc/B56R-D5Y8] (archived Sept. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Cafaggi, Food
Safety].
43. See Kaplinsky, supranote 27.
44. Cafaggi et al., supranote 42, at 50; see also Raphael Kaplinsky & Mike Morris,
Value Chain Analysis: A Tool for Enhancing Export Supply Policies, 1 INT'L J. TECH.
LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 283, 288 (2008).

45. Kaplinsky, supra note 27, at 87.
46. Id.; Cattaneo et al., supra note 30, at 4-5; see also Gilson et al., Contractingfor
Innovation, supra note 37; Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and
Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006). The
fact that business is heavily dependent on the parties' relationships has long been
reflected in the literature on relational contracts. For the seminal study in that regard,
see generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). See also Ian R Macneil, Relational Contract: What
We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 484 (1985).
47.
See, e.g., Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 44, at 284.
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non-price-based factor that sets the good or the brand apart from its
competitors, whether it is the status (cool, prestigious, etc.) of the
brand itself or some inherent quality of the good in particular (organic
ingredients, fair trade certified, etc.). For reasons of quality control and
certainty, the maintenance of a successful differentiation strategy
typically requires the lead firm to increasingly interject itself into the
48
day-to-day activities of its suppliers.
Third, and related to the previous point, is reputation. As the
importance of brands has grown in world commerce, so too has the
value of the reputation of those brands. 49 Nike discovered this when it
was revealed in the 1990s that Nike was purchasing goods from
suppliers that relied on unconscionable working conditions
("sweatshop labor") in developing countries. 50 Nike's initial response
was that it did not own or control these suppliers, rather it simply
bought from them; therefore, it was not responsible. 51 While this
assertion is true as a purely legal matter (among other things, because
of the lack of privity 52), public outcry proved to be significant and
caused Nike to revise its supply practices. 53 Nike then began-as many
Western companies now do-to monitor the day-to-day activities of its
suppliers with increased vigilance. 54 What were once arms-length

48. See, e.g., Cafaggi et al., supra note 42, at 69.
49.
Humphrey & Schmitz, supranote 27, at 271.
50. E.g. Mares, supra note 40, at 199-200 n.30 ("The scandals in which Nike
became entangled in the 1990s and that propelled CSR on the international agenda had
to do with abuses taking place further down in the supply chain, in factories not owned
or operated by Nike. As a result, in 1998, Phil Knight, Nike's chief executive, admitted
that '[t]he Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and
arbitrary abuse."') (citing J. H. Cushman, Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Laborand Apply
U.S. Rules Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13
fbusiness/international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-child-labor-andapplyus -rulesabroad.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/FEG4-R9PF] (archived Sept. 27,
2016)).
51. E.g., Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: CorporateCodes of Conduct
and the Governance of Labor Standards in the InternationalSupply Chain, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 397, 404 (2010) ("Nike's experience during the 1990s illustrates the
harmful economic consequences to a corporation that dismisses sweatshop allegations.
When CEO Phil Knight first was accused of running sweatshops at Nike's Indonesian
factories, he denied responsibility for the practices of their contractors.").
52, For an excellent discussion of the role of privity in global value chains, see
Jaakko Salminen, Contract Boundary Spanning Governance Mechanisms:
Conceptualizing Fragmented and Globalized Production as Collectively Governed
Entities, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 725-26 (2016).
53.
E.g., Maryanov, supra note 51, at 404 ("[Nike's] position changed when
widespread associations between Nike, child labor, and women's exploitation caused the
company's capitalized value and brand reputation to plummet, leading Nike to initiate
a public relations campaign and adopt a code of conduct in 1992").
54.
See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and
ReputationalAccountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 41, 48-52 (2010); Li-Wen Lin, Legal
Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply
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purchases from suppliers have now become parts of a more integrated
production strategy. In a similar way, what was once an aspiration of
the Corporate Social Responsibility movement, 55 has now become a
56
corporate necessity.
Fourth, government regulation has forced lead firms in certain
instances to engage more directly across their chains. 57 In some
areas-such as environmental and labor standards-Western
governments still impose few obligations on Western corporations in
regard to their supply chains. 58 But in other areas, such as foodstuffs,
Western governments are enacting more stringent laws. For instance,
some domestic laws require traceability, meaning that a lead firm must
be able to trace foodstuffs through all suppliers back to the farmer. 59

Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 718 (2009); John M. Conley & Cynthia
A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate
Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 1-2 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization,35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002); Mares, supra note 40, at 195
("Central to CSR writings is the idea that social and environmental impacts should be
integrated into regular business decision-making and that companies should take
systematic due diligence steps to prevent and remedy harmful impacts.").
56. See, e.g., Cafaggi, Food Safety, supra note 42, at 3 ("Large retailers need to be
market responsive to western consumers who have become ever more demanding and
self-conscious since the recent food crises.").
57. See, e.g., Humphrey & Schmitz, supra note 27, at 267.
58. For a limited statutory exception, see California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act of 2010, S. 657, 2009-2010 Sess. (Cal. 2010). That Act, however, imposes only
reporting requirements and is not triggered until a company has over $100 million in
annual worldwide gross receipts. Id. at § 3(a)(1) ("Every retail seller and manufacturer
doing business in this state and having annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one
hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) shall disclose, as set forth in subdivision (c), its
efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain for
tangible goods offered for sale."). In a litigation context, see Choc v. Hudbay Minerals
Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414 (Can.). There, a group of Indigenous Mayan Q'eqchi' from
Guatemala alleged gang rape, murder, and other atrocities at the hands of security
personnel working for the subsidiary of a Canadian mining company, Hudbay Minerals
Inc. In Canada, the Plaintiffs filed, inter alia, claims of direct negligence against this
Canadian parent. The parent company moved to strike on the grounds that the Plaintiffs
stated no cause of action in negligence against them. In a decision that has potential
future significance concerning the obligations of Canadian companies in regard to their
supply chains, Judge Carole Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled
against the parent company, finding that
a novel claim of negligence should only be struck at the pleadings stage where it
is clearly unsustainable. In this case, it cannot be said that it is clearly
unsustainable or untenable. The plaintiffs have properly pleaded the elements
necessary to recognize a novel duty of care. The plaintiffs have also pleaded that
the defendants breached the duty of care and that the breach caused the
plaintiffs' losses. Accordingly, I find that it is not plain and obvious that the three
Statements of Claim disclose no reasonable cause of action in negligence.
Id. at para. 75.
59. Cafaggi, Food Safety, supra note 42, at 18.
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The ability to do so compels the lead firm to have substantial
60
involvement across the entire chain.
In sum, the processes necessary to produce most products and
services globally have become more systemic. 6 1 Further, almost twothirds of all traded goods today are "intermediate goods," meaning that
they are parts, components, or other unfinished items that are
produced or worked on but which are then, after these value-adding
activities, destined for incorporation elsewhere into a completed
product. 62 Many such goods, by definition, are both imported into and
exported out of supplier countries during the course of their transit
through the global value chain.63 These systemic corporate connections
therefore bind not only companies but also the nation-states in which
the companies operate; this commerce, like the notion of sovereignty
with which it is intimately intertwined, does not occur in a vacuum,
but rather is intensely integrative.
III.

WHAT THE COOK ISLANDS MAKES POSSIBLE FOR AN
ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGNTY

The Cook Islands was and is an ideal location for researching
sovereignty. Although the islands were colonized and remained under
colonial rule for nearly a century, the country gained independence in
1965. As such, the formation of the Cook Islands nation-state is a
recent, fresh phenomenon, often in the hearts and on the lips of its
citizens. This sovereignty is, furthermore, an advancing work-inprogress, as politicians and lay-people alike continue to debate ideas,
to test tactics, and to work to strengthen this tiny country they have
created. Significantly, however, the story of the Cook Islands
sovereignty is not one of unilateral efforts to distance itself from its
former colonizers. Instead, the Cook Islands sovereignty is explicitly

60. Cafaggi explains that "[s]tate regulation of imported food has proven to be
difficult to implement without the active involvement of the entire supply chain." Id. at
1.
61.
See Sobel-Read, supra note 31; Kaplinsky, supranote 27, at 84; Humphrey &
Schmitz, supranote 27, at 274-75; Gereffi et al., supra note 27, at 82-83.
62. Cattaneo et al., supranote 30, at 4; see also Gereffi et al., supranote 27, at 80.
63. Global value chains therefore implicate both export barriers and import
barriers. Cattaneo et al., supra note 30, at 18. Furthermore, Cattaneo et al. give the
following figures: "typically, about one-third of the imported intermediate goods are
destined for the export market, with higher ratios in smaller economies (e.g. up to twothirds for a country like Hungary) and in certain sectors (e.g. the foreign content of
electronic goods exports was 40 perfect in China and Korea, and up to 60 percent in
Mexico)." Id.

at 4 (citing OECD, OECD-WTO DATABASE ON TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED

http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TVA-stats /20flyerENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7SHXE23] (archived Sept. 27, 2016)). By the same token, exports in international trade
contain an average import content of approximately 40 percent. See Cattaneo et al.,
supra note 30, at 3.
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built-with remarkable strategic savvy-on the close relations that the
country maintains with Aotearoa/New Zealand. 4

The Cook Islands is a small nation-state made up of fifteen
primary islands that are spread across hundreds of thousands of
square miles of the South Pacific Ocean. By rough measurement, this
island group lies directly below Hawai'i, about as far below the equator
as Hawai'i is above it. Geographically and culturally, the country is
divided in two, between the seven islands of the smaller Northern
Group and the eight islands of the larger Southern Group. The main
island of Rarotonga is located in the Southern Group.
Roughly 60,000-75,000 Cook Islanders reside in New Zealand and
Australia. Of those who remain in the Cook Islands, most of the
population-more than three quarters of the roughly 14,000
residents-live on Rarotonga. Rarotonga also serves as the seat of the
national government, as the business hub, and, indeed, as the gateway
to the rest of the country. The remaining islands are referred to as the
Outer Islands. One of these Outer Islands, Aitutaki, has what is
perhaps the most beautiful lagoon in the world and has had some
success with tourism. The other Outer Islands, with some exception for
pearl farming and a little agriculture and tourism, currently support
very little commercial economic activity.
Until the larger-scale arrival of Europeans in the 1800s, all of the
islands of the now-Cook Islands were, in large part, independent
entities, many of which participated together in regional (especially
within the Southern Group and the Northern Group respectively)
trade, intermarriage, and fighting. The alliance of these fifteen islands
into a single country-indeed, into a single governmental entity of any
sort-is solely the result of the arbitrary hand of colonial
administration, which has both united and divided the islands of the
broader region. The Northern Group island of Pukapuka, for instance,
is physically closer to, and has more culturally in common with, Samoa
than it does Rarotonga-yet it was made a part of the Cook Islands.

64. Within its own borders, and across the broader Pacific region, New Zealand is
often referred to as Aotearoa (Land of the Long White Cloud) or Aotearoa/New Zealand.
And indeed, the different names compete in the vernacular of English-language
discourse about the country. Contested ideologies of history and power are of course
hidden in this linguistic battle. The name "New Zealand" was coined by early Dutch
explorers and later adapted by Captain Cook. There is debate about the origins of the
term "Aotearoa," and indeed, it may be somewhat of a neologism; even so, it is clear that
in the fraternity of European colonialism, the British adopted an anglicized version of
the Dutch term rather than an Indigenous name. With much hesitation, I have chosen
the label New Zealand for these pages.
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Conversely, the islands, especially of the Southern Group have
traditionally had extremely close relationships with the island of
Tahiti and several other of the neighboring islands of French
Polynesia, yet there the indiscriminate process of colonization served
to sever rather than to join.
Standing on the shores of any of these islands, one cannot help but
respect the magnificent feats of the early canoe-sailors who discovered
the various dots of land that make up the area we have come to call
Polynesia. This area is essentially comprised of all the islands
contained within a giant triangle across the South Pacific Ocean, for
which New Zealand, Hawai'i, and Easter Island (also known as Rapa
Nui) make up the three points. Within this frame, many of the regions
have different histories. Tonga and Western Samoa, for example, were
settled some 3,000 years ago; Hawai'i and the Cook Islands were
reached later, about 1,700 years ago; 65 then, approximately 900 years
ago, a group of large sailing canoes that left the Cook Islands carried a
66
small group who found and settled what is now New Zealand.
Given the Polynesians' skills as sailors, they were able to maintain
links over remarkably vast spans of ocean. These links were, however,
mostly between islands as independent entities-or, given some infighting, between independent villages. 67 Over time, the connections
across longer stretches of Polynesia became less frequent if not
obsolete. 68 But across shorter distances, such as between what are now
the Cook Islands and French Polynesia, the people continued for
centuries to intermarry, trade, and fight across the hundreds of miles
of ocean that in some senses separated and in other senses connected
69
them.

65.
Guy Powles, The Common Law as a Source of Law in the South Pacific:
Experiences in Western Polynesia, 10 U. HAW. L. REV. 105, 115 (1988).
66. There is, however, a difficulty in constructing a history of places like the South
Pacific because most written angles are tainted by colonial points of view. E.g., ROBERT
NICOLE, THE WORD, THE PEN, AND THE PISTOL: LITERATURE AND POWER IN TAHITI 1-2

(2001).
67.
See RON CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS: NEW ZEALAND'S RELATIONS WITH
OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDS (1992) [hereinafter, CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS]; Solomon

Mamaloni,

The

Road

to

Independence,

in

INDEPENDENCE,

DEPENDENCE,

INTERDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST 10 YEARS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS INDEPENDENCE 7 (Ron

Crocombe & Esau Tuza eds., 1992).
68. CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS, supra note 67, at xviii.
69.
Well-known Tongan anthropologist, Epeli Hau'ofa, has described the sea as
connecting the islands of the Pacific, rather than separating them. Epeli Hau'ofa, Our
Sea of Islands, in A NEW OCEANIA: REDISCOVERING OUR SEA OF ISLANDS 1, 8-9 (Vijay
Naidu, Eric Waddell, & Epeli Hau'ofa, eds., 1993). See also CROCOMBE, PACIFIC
NEIGHBOURS, supra note 67, at 193 ("Water facilitates good relations. The greatest
irritant in international relations elsewhere in the world is land boundaries, which are
so often disputed."); Pdr Olausson, AUTONOMY AND ISLANDS: A GLOBAL STUDY OF THE
FACTORS THAT DETERMINE ISLAND AUTONOMY (2007).
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During much of the 1800s, most of the islands of Polynesia fell
victim to colonization, generally at the hands of the British, the
Germans, and the French. 70 In the early years, many island peoples
resisted with violence, but eventually the Europeans' more powerful
weapons won out, not to mention the devastating effects suffered by
71
Polynesians from the Western diseases introduced into the islands.
At the same time, this colonial process served to bind, in different ways,
the various islands to Europe, for instance, plugging the Cook Islands
into the particular set of global relationships for which Britain was the
hub.
Since the mid-1900s, across Polynesia, the post-colonial period has
given rise to a number of different political statuses and
relationships. 72 Among these, there is New Zealand, which, like the
United States, was colonized by the British and then achieved
independence at the hands of its European descendants. 73 Other areas,
such as Hawai'i and Easter Island, have been absorbed into their
settler states (the United States and Chile, respectively). Tonga and
Tuvalu are independent. And the famous islands of Tahiti and French
74
Polynesia, like New Caledonia, are now territories of France.
The Cook Islands received independence in 1965-an
independence that deserves special discussion. Initially, it was the
British who colonized the Cook Islands. In 1901, however, colonial
control was handed over to New Zealand. At the time, New Zealand
was eager to take on colonies in an effort to mimic the European
powers. New Zealanders were very quick to find out, however, that
colonies were expensive and, rather than prestigious, had become a
"political embarrassment. ' 75

70. Tonga is an interesting example of a domain that was missionized by-and
therefore heavily influenced by-the Europeans, but was never formally colonized
politically; today it is a constitutional monarchy.
71.

See NICOLE, supra note 66, at 168.

72.
Prominent South Pacific anthropologist Ron Crocombe has noted that "[a]s
international political entities, the islands did not exist until the 1960s and 1970s." He
adds: "Independence ...changed all that. Power came to be located in islands [sic]
capitals in a way it never had been before - ever .... CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS,
supra note 67, at 164.
73.
New Zealand is home to a large minority of Polynesian people now referred to
collectively as the Maori. When the Europeans arrived, there were an estimated
100,000-200,000 Maori; as of the 2006 census, there were 565,329 people "of Maori
ethnicity," who make up roughly 14 percent of New Zealand's total population of
4,027,947.

QuickStats

National

Highlights,

STATISTICS

NEW

ZEALAND,

http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2006CensusHomePage/QuickStats/quickstats-about-asubject/national-highlights/population-and-dwellings.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/7HR8-KRAD] (archived Sept. 7, 2016).
74. See CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS, supra note 67.
75. Id. at 163.
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So New Zealand later sought prestige in other ways. In an effort
to gain favor in the United Nations, New Zealand pursued an
76
aggressive plan of decolonization with regard to its island territories.
As part of this process, the people of the Cook Islands were offered
three UN-driven options: (1) full independence, (2) to become
incorporated into New Zealand, or (3) to become what was termed as
independent "in free association with" New Zealand. 77 Cook Islanders
chose the third option, and, in 1965, the Cook Islands officially became
an independent state "in free association with" New Zealand. 78
The words "in free association with" have been the subject of much
inquiry, discussion, and debate. Indeed, the Cook Islands was the first
state to enter into free-associated status, so there was no template to
follow. 79 In the words of one former prime minister, "you couldn't just
turn to page X in the law books" to see how it all was to work.8 0 Several
core concepts, however, are clear: free-associated status means that the
Cook Islands is an independent state with the constitutional right to
full independence. At the same time, and until it chooses otherwise, it
allows certain functional aspects of its statehood-primarily, the bulk
of its foreign affairs and defense-to be handled by New Zealand.81 As
a theoretical matter note that, even though the Cobk Islands, in
choosing free-associated status, might arguably have agreed to share
some aspects of its statehood, the country was still, in the moment of
82
making that decision, undeniably exercising "full" independence.
The Cook Islands nevertheless can, and does, enter into treaties
and other international agreements on its own account. Two examples
are the Treaty on Friendship and Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between the United States and the Cook Islands, 83 and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.8 4 The Cook

76.
New Zealand was in fact the first country to decolonize a UN trust territoryWestern Samoa in 1962. Id. at 163.
77.

See JEFFREY SISSONS, NATION AND DESTINATION: CREATING COOK ISLANDS

IDENTITY 11 (1999); CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS, supra note 67, at 171.
78. Id.
79. Niue later entered into a similar relationship with New Zealand in 1974. Id. at
171.
80.
Conversation with former Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Henry (April 20, 2010).
81.
E.g., CROCOMBE, PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS, supra note 67, at 171. Note also that
in the ways of many [former] members of the British Empire, the Queen of England
serves as the official head of state of the Cook Islands. See COOK ISLANDS CONST., part
1, art. 2 (Dec. 21, 2004).
82.
Conversation with Mike Mitchell, then Cook Islands High Commissioner to
New Zealand, June 28, 2010.
83.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Cook Islands on
Friendship and Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the United States of
America and the Cook Islands, U.S.-Cook Islands, June 11, 1980, 1676 U.N.T.S. 223.
84. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Sept. 2, 1990).
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Islands is also a member of the World Health Organization. 85 Although
not a "member" of the United Nations itself, the Cook Islands is still a
member of several of its organizations, such as being a "member state"
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
86
Organization (UNESCO).
Importantly, as part of this arrangement between the Cook
Islands and New Zealand, Cook Islanders are automatically citizens of
New Zealand. The reverse, however, is not true, and non-Cook Islander
New Zealanders are not entitled-automatically or otherwise-to
become Cook Islands citizens (at most they can receive what is called
permanent resident status). And, although the Cook Islands
experimented briefly with using its own currency, for most of its history
it has used, and continues to use, the New Zealand dollar.

IV. A MODEL

OF CONTEMPORARY SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty is more than jurisdiction and it is more than personal
sentiment. Sovereignty is several things together, all of which are
essential to understanding the concept as a whole:
(1)

(2)

a functional/instrumentalcomponent, comprised of
*
an interface mechanism
*
a value-maximization mechanism
an emotional component.

First, sovereignty is comprised of a functional/instrumental
component. This component is nearly identical among and across all
groups such that, even if some sovereignties operate differently from
others, the structure is still roughly the same for all. This component
is likewise the machinery that makes sovereignty work. Sovereignty
is, after all, not just an idea, concept, or belief, but is also a system that
people organize themselves under, that people live by; people are all,
whether they like it or not, embedded in a world of nation-states, of socalled sovereignties. 87 This functional/instrumental component of

85.
See Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int
countries/en/ (last visited April 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RN3R-EJ4E] (archived Sept.
7, 2016) (noting that "[t]erritories which are not responsible for the conduct of their
international relations may be admitted as Associate Members upon application made
on their behalf by the Member or other authority responsible for their international
relations").
86.
Countries, UNESCO, http://en.unesco.org/countries/c (last visited Jan. 13,
2016) [https://perma.cc/QA3Z-MSAG] (archived Sept. 7, 2016).
87.
Note that sovereignty, even nation-state sovereignty, is different from the
state. Sovereignty is a concept-but not only a concept but also an enacted reality, a
framework, a process. The state, in turn, is a tool, populated by actors, for managing
sovereignty.

1070

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.49.1045

sovereignty is comprised, in turn, of two elements, one that serves as
an interface mechanism with other sovereignties and another that
functions to maximize selected local values.
Second, sovereignty is made up of a subjective component that is
unique to each group. I call this component emotional sovereignty.8 8 A
group's emotional attachment to the sovereignty is, of course, related
to the values being maximized by the functional element of
sovereignty. 89 This relationship illustrates the symbiotic nature of
these several components of sovereignty: they impact each other just
as they function together.90

88. By using the term "emotional," I am not seeking to link to any existing
literatures. On the whole, I use the term in its lay sense, for its common meaning of
feelings that are recognizable but not quantifiable, a force that drives us, animates us,
subject to influence but never to full conscious control. Certainly, there is a growing body
of scholarly work on affective phenomena (e.g., HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, THE METHOD OF
HOPE: ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, AND FIJIAN KNOWLEDGE (2004)), but I am neither

attempting to specifically incorporate nor to refute that literature. The seminal work of
Catherine Lutz in this area does, however, provide two important insights here.
Catherine Lutz, Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement:Emotion as a Cultural Category,
1 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 287, 289, 291 (1986). On the one hand, emotion is-

in part,

at least- culturally constituted. This is consistent with my use of the term "emotion" in
relation to sovereignty because I argue that each group's emotional sovereignty is
qualitatively unique. On the other hand, given that it is culturally constituted, emotion
is both an individual and a social phenomenon. This duality likewise permeates my use
of the term emotional sovereignty, in that I am including individuals'relationships with
a given sovereignty, but always and necessarily within the context of a group and the
group's relationships to the sovereignty: these are the ties that bind, the reasons that
people often unite in the magic of nation-building, whether because of ethnicity,
ancestry, land, or common rights-or even as a result of force-but likewise subject to
individual deviation, contestation, and resistance.
89. One might be tempted to describe this phenomenon as "nationalism." And
indeed, there may be considerable overlap between the two ideas. But I do not believe
that the literatures on sovereignty and nationalism can simply be combined. Nor can I
agree with an equation such as: sovereignty = nationalism + [something],no matter what
the "something" is.
90. As such, it goes without saying that any one of these components is insufficient
on its own to explain contemporary sovereignty in its entirety. Certainly, a collective
belief in a group, even a subjective attachment to the nation, does not alone create
sovereignty; sovereignty must be something more, sovereignty must function. At the
same time, sovereignty is not a lifeless machine, devoid of human involvement. To be
sure, in many cases the people of a sovereign state feel allegiance, occasionally love,
toward that state; sometimes that love and allegiance even rises to the level of
fanaticism. But other sovereign states function by force, by the subjugation of some or
most of the population who might not share the nationalist visions of the state's leaders.
But even here, two points are important. First, those who are unwilling citizens of any
state still live in the functioning of the state, still have a relationship with the state, no
matter how violent; their subjective relationship with the state still affects the
functioning of the state, even if that relationship is resistance rather than love and
allegiance. And second, regardless of the level of oppression, the sovereignty of the state
is still organized, managed, by people it is never wholly automatic or mechanical, but
always human. In other words, the point is not that sovereignty is in every instance
made up of ideal flag-waving, fluff-and-roses allegiance to the sovereignty; no, allegiance
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So, contemporary sovereignty is not just subjective and not just
functional, it is both. As such, an understanding of all the parts is
necessary to understand the whole.
A. The Functional/InstrumentalSide of Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty has traditionally been posited as one
that marks borders between political/jurisdictional entities. 91 But
today, no land is fully bordered. The pores may vary in shape, size, and
permeability, but every border is porous. More importantly perhaps,
sovereignty is not something that is but is something that does. It is
not the ethereal fantasy of philosophers, but the day-to-day existence
of the nation-state, as managed by the people who populate it and in
constant flux due not only to domestic caprice but also to the dynamic
influences of other nation-states.
Indeed, trying to understand sovereignty-or the people of a given
sovereignty-by only looking inward has always been incomplete.
Groups are inevitably structured against and in relation to other
people; just as individuals do not exist in isolation, neither do groups,
nor have they ever. Even when groups arrive in a new place-such as
the Maori in the previously unpopulated New Zealand-they soon
divide into subgroups, in existence vis-&-vis the others.
So an understanding of any group's sovereignty must account for
the ways that that group's sovereignty relates to other groups'
sovereignties. This is the functional/instrumental element of
sovereignty, and, unlike the emotional element of sovereignty, which
is unique and different for all groups, the functional/instrumental
element is similar for and among all groups. 92
This functional/instrumental element of sovereignty is made up of
two parts. The first part operates as an interface mechanism, that is to
say, as the procedural machinery that allows nation-states to
communicate, relate to each other, and do business together. 9 3 The
second part serves as a value-maximization mechanism. Here, the role

is often contested-even enforced by violence-but whatever the case, sovereignty is
lived, experienced. There is, in short, always a subjective relationship between
individuals and the state that is a component of that state's sovereignty.
91.
E.g., DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001); DAVID. E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA

LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 4
(2001).
92.
For an in-depth discussion see infra Section IV.B.
93.
For excellent discussions of sovereignty as "relational sovereignty," see
Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and American
Indian Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239 (2005); JESSICA CATTELINO, HIGH STAKES:
FLORIDA SEMINOLE GAMING AND SOVEREIGNTY (2008); VALERIE LAMBERT, CHOCTAW
NATION: A STORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESURGENCE (2007).

1072

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:1045

of the nation-state is as a gate-keeper of what the state-as the
presumptive proxy for the people-determines are the characteristics
of culture worthy of support. 94 As such, the role of the state in
maintaining sovereignty is to interface with outside states in order to
generate enough capital (and have the person-power to do so) to be able
to best promote the domestic values that are deemed most worthy. It
is this aspect of sovereignty that is the crux of the symbiotic
relationship between the outward-focusing and inward-focusing
aspects of sovereignty.
In a pivotal way, law is central to these two parts of sovereignty's
functional/instrumental component. Law holds this central position
because any given nation-state will construct a system of laws to
manage both of the characteristics noted above: this system of law is
the filter through which the interface with other nation-states occurs,
just as it is the structure that determines which cultural elements are
supported and which are disfavored. 95 In other words, the national
regulation of cross-border capital structures a state's relationship with
the global market and is therefore an interface with that global
market; at the same time, national regulation structures how incoming
capital is distributed domestically/internally. Moreover, these factors
are, of course, intertwined: the domestic distribution of capital affects
the state's relationship with the global market, and vice versa.
1. Sovereignty as an Interface Mechanism
Capital is fungible. Nation-states' laws create interfaces for the
transfer of capital. Between and among nation-states, these interfaces
intersect. The interfaces are aligned-as if by compatible nozzles on
different types of hoses-which makes the movement of capital, as well
as people, possible. So nation-state systems of law on the one hand
create the interface necessary to interact-among other things, to do
business-with other countries, and on the other hand allow each
individual country to regulate the flow of capital, people, and business
across its borders.
To put it differently, sovereignty here is the structural form that,
via its procedural mechanisms, allows nation-states to interface with
other nation-states. All nation-states are different: their people are
different and they function differently internally. But by convention,

94.
Obviously, what a culture "is," and what its values are, are always and
continuously contested.
95. This function takes place not only explicitly but also by virtue of the structure
of the system itself. As a simple analogy, imagine a taxing regime that favors those with
capital gains over those with wage income; by virtue of the system itself, the "pie" is
divided in such a way that is to the benefit of one group and to the detriment of the other.
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all nation-states have come to have specific sets of structural
attributes. They have things like passports, embassies, a flag, a capital,
et cetera. Yet, each nation-state also has particular sub-sets of laws
that provide the mechanisms for interfacing with other countries, such
as customs laws, immigration laws, and import/export laws. These
particular sets of laws serve to translate domestic laws into a global
lingua franca. So, for instance, the property laws and employment laws
that apply at an industrial factory, otherwise wholly domestic (and
unique) in nature, are linked to the international marketplace and can
be made to function in conjunction with a foreign company that might
buy (or hire) the factory.
A simple illustration can be seen in the postal systems of the
countries of the world. Each functions very differently internally,
domestically. Take, for example, two countries where I have performed
research, Sweden and the Cook Islands. An on-going debate in Sweden
involves whether mail-carriers should be relieved of putting the mail
through the individual mail slot of each and every family's door in a
multi-story apartment building (as is the current practice), given the
wear-and-tear on the carrier's knees from going up and down so many
flights of stairs each day. In the Cook Islands, by contrast, not only is
there no such debate regarding the physiological strains of the
country's postal carriers, there is in fact no mail delivery service at all;
instead, all mail is placed in post-office boxes, for retrieval by the
recipient. As such, there are phenomenal differences between these
two countries' domestic postal systems. But the two systems-like
compatible nozzles on different hoses-interface, they function
together: mail can be and is sent seamlessly between the two
countries-across half the planet. Even packages-goods requiring the
state intervention of customs clearance-regularly cross borders,
carried between diverse senders and recipients by the compatible
machinery of interlocking global relationships. More complex systems
of law and commerce function similarly.
Keep in mind, of course, that the whole of global economics is
made up of much more than basic national systems that interface with
a global system-there are many, many layers and varieties of
economic systems at play. 9 6 Moreover, each of these many economic
sub-systems can and will interface differently with the global system,
with one or more national systems, and/or with each other. But in these
cases, there are still points of interface where the systems meet, where
translation between them occurs, and where sovereignty consequently
becomes implicated and is often negotiated.

96.
See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1-2 (2006).
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a. Evidence from the Cook Islands
(1) The Visible Doorway: Customs and Immigration
The Cook Islands maintains a customs office and an immigration
office, each of which operates under a set of laws enacted for these
purposes. 97 In regard to interface mechanisms with the global
community, customs and immigration schemes-regulating the arrival
of goods and individuals, respectively-are of central importance, as
they stand as perhaps the most obvious regulatory doorway onto the
physical land of the Cook Islands and into the jurisdiction of the nationstate.
The impact of these two offices on the country is, of course,
substantial. For instance, customs laws restrict-by means of duties
and levies-the importation of pork and certain seasonal vegetables
grown in the Cook Islands. 98 Domestic producers are naturally the
beneficiaries of these regulations. Other duties and levies on alcohol 99
raise the price of alcoholic beverages, thereby affecting consumption
(while naturally raising government revenue100).
At the same time, immigration rules dictate who can be in the
country and for how long. One focus of such regulation is to attempt to
limit foreign residents to those who benefit the Cook Islands, whether
by contributing capital and entrepreneurship or by providing direct
wage labor. Furthermore, unless one receives permanent resident

97. Cook Islands: Entry, Residence and Departure Act 1971-72, §§ 7, 27, (Mar. 20,
1972) http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b536c.html
[https://perma.cc/7WCP-FPXN]
(archived Sept. 27, 2016) (addressing, inter alia, the responsibilities of immigration
officers (Section 7), entry into the Cook Islands (Part I1I), and the inspection of crews,
passengers, shops and aircraft (Section 27)); Customs Tariff Act 1980, §§ 6,7,
http://www.paclii.org/ck/legis/num-act/cta1980178/
(last visited Oct. 15, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/T9LK-82KF (archived Sept. 27, 2016) (addressing, inter alia,
determinations relating to certain goods (Section 6) and the power to alter duties (Section
7)).
98. Import
Levy
Amendment
Act
1978-79
(Cook
Islands)
http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ck/legis/num-act/ilal9781979246/ilal9781979
246.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZK7S-MVSH] (archived Oct. 15,
2016) (imposing a 25 percent levy on "Pork and pig products, frozen, chilled or similar,"
as well as a 25 percent levy on a range of vegetables including cabbages, carrots, lettuce,
pumpkin, radishes, and tomatoes).
99. Id. (imposing the following duties: Beer (60 cents per liquid gallon); Cordials,
Liqueurs and Bitters, Spirituous beverages, the strength of which can be ascertained by
Sike's hydrometer ($15.50 per liquid gallon); Wines, all kinds ($6.10 per liquid gallon);
Other Alcoholic beverages ($6.10 per liquid gallon)).
100. Some 30 percent of the government's direct revenue for purposes of the
national budget comes from fees taken in by the customs office, of which duties and levies
on alcohol make up one part.
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status,1 0 1 a residence permit must be renewed yearly so that the state
can annually reevaluate a foreigner's perceived worthiness.
These portals for international movement are subject to the
vagaries of human intuition, predilection, and mistake. This is natural.
The point is that this key interface with the global community and the
global marketplace is dynamic on multiple levels. First, it is
Parliament that establishes the laws that mark the blueprint of this
interface mechanism. Within this blueprint, the internal regulations of
the Customs Office and the Immigration Office structure the day-today functionings of the mechanism. And then, of course, the individual
staff members play their own role in applying the regulations to the
real-world issues that they confront. Then, importantly, in regard to
perceived successes or failures of these regimes (such as whether too
many foreigners might be settling in the country), public sentiment
might influence Parliament to alter the laws-continuing the feedback
mechanism.
But, regardless of any such adjustments to the law, the fact
remains that the customs and immigration laws and offices, as the
portals they are, interface with the outside world. Moreover, they do so
as a function of state sovereignty.
(2) Tourism: The Core of the Cook Islands' Economy
A nation-state's interface with other sovereignties is primarily for
purposes of participation in the global marketplace. But states'
abilities to do so vary greatly and no state has available to it a full
range of interface options. This is because a given state will only be
attractive to the global market in regard to those resources available
in that state and based on the state's ability to furnish those resources
in an efficient, sufficient, and compelling manner.
That said, states certainly have the power to affect the types of
interfaces that they have with the global market-the key point is that
they are forced to do so within the boundaries of what is available.
Thus, Greenland could obviously not compete on the global market as
a sun-and-fun locale, just as Barbados cannot re-create itself as a
snowboarding destination.
As a small state in the middle of the ocean, the Cook Islands is, of
course, a good example of a state that is limited in the ways that it can
interface with the global marketplace. For a location like the Cook
Islands, tourism is a manifest option and the Cook Islands has very

101. Although currently permanent resident status is decided by the Immigration
Office-that is to say, by the state-proposals have been put forth to involve in that
decision-making process the local traditional leader of the applicant's residence area.
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much pushed to be a player in this market. 102 But, just as no state has
available to it every economic option, it is equally true that the
availability of a resource does not guarantee that the resource will be
profitable, or even that taking advantage of that resource is a foregone
conclusion. In short, the possession of beautiful beaches does not
03
automatically turn a given state into a prime tourism destination. 1
The Cook Islands possesses the natural attributes of a sunny tourist
destination but has had to proactively manage the process of
transforming its islets of tropical beauty into functional nodal pointstransmitters and receptors--of the global economy. This effort has
been ongoing since independence.
Furthermore, this effort has evolved in a broader regional and
global context. Much has been written about the mystique of Polynesia,
largely in regard to Tahiti; 104 interestingly, the Cook Islands has
benefitted from this myth and has also been harmed by it. On the one
hand, Cook Islands' tourism is enhanced by the European/American
construction of Polynesia as a place of beauty and fantasy. On the other
hand, the geographic proximity of Tahiti has meant that the Cook
Islands also has had to compete directly against Tahiti. This direct
competition is made all the more difficult by the long head-start that
Tahiti has had in terms of marketing itself (and in having its imposed
myths market for it). But, at the same time, the directness of the
competition is eased by the difference in colonial language and the
natural tendency of Tahiti to attract native French speakers while
05
some native English speakers prefer the Cook Islands. 1

102. By contrast, the Cook Islands is ill-suited to most production-type industries,
even those that might exist on a small scale. A major problem is the procurement of
materials. Thus, as it was explained to me, even something that seems small and simple,
like jam production (which might otherwise seem like a promising business in a place
where fresh fruit is so abundant), can be very difficult. After all, when on a small island,
if one runs out of, say, lids for jam jars, one is simply out of luck until the next shipment
arrives. Conversation with Louisa Sifakula, Pacific Island Trade and Investment
Commission, April 7, 2010. Indeed, even if parts have been ordered, the timing of
deliveries, unless air-freighted, can easily be delayed because of weather that prevents
a ship from docking or due to other logistical factors relating to sea transportation.
103. Around the South Pacific, there are certainly many countries that have
beautiful beaches and climates but that receive very little tourism; certainly, many
islands of the Cook Islands, while in classical terms among the most spectacular in the
world, receive almost no tourists. Samoa is an example of a South Pacific country that is
actively working to build up its currently under-developed tourism industry. On the
opposite side of the globe, the states surrounding the Mediterranean Sea offer other good
examples. In terms of sea-side tourism, Albania and Montenegro have nowhere near the
drawing power of neighboring global icons Italy and Greece, and therefore can demand
nowhere near the same prices; in this regard, Croatia is interesting as a less-expensive
but up-and-coming mid-point.
104. See generally NICOLE, supranote 66.
105. Recall that historically and culturally, the people of Tahiti are among the most
closely related to Cook Islanders and the two groups speak mutually intelligible
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Several factors have combined to make tourism the core-some 70
percent-of the Cook Islands' economy. First, as noted, the Cook
Islands is made up of a genre of natural beauty that is held in high
esteem by many. That beauty, in turn, has been mystified, objectified,
and transformed into a market commodity by forces of colonialism
(exoticism) and capitalism (the tourism industry, among others).
Second, successive generations of Cook Islander leaders have
recognized the (economic) value of tourism and have pushed the
country, with some considerable success, to build itself in the image of
a (pre-constructed) tourist destination. 106 Third, changes in the local
economy have facilitated the solidification of tourism as the primary
economic factor, at least on the main island of Rarotonga and the island
of Aitutaki.
These latter changes in the local economy have in part been
caused by shifts in the global economy. Over the past several decades
agricultural production has become less profitable in the Cook Islands
because earlier target markets-including New Zealand and Australia,
as well as the United States and Europe-can now all obtain similar
fruits from cheaper global locations. The combination of decreasing
profits from agriculture and more lucrative profits from the tourism
sector-as well as the spread and amplification of Western,
individualist practices-have led many on the island of Rarotonga to
cease growing crops and to construct one or more bungalows or other
living spaces for rental to tourists. 1 0 7 Not only are such bungalows and
rooms often more profitable than agriculture, but they also generally
require much less time and physical labor.

Indigenous languages. But as mentioned, the contemporary English-versus-French
linguistic splice between the two is another marker of the arbitrariness of post-colonial
nation-state building.
106. For a corresponding discussion in regard to the Dali region in China, see BETH
E. NOTAR, DISPLACING DESIRE: TRAVEL AND POPULAR CULTURE IN CHINA (2006).
Further, these efforts confirm the fact that a given country's success in a certain market
is not due solely to what the global market allows but is also necessarily related to human
factors, such as who promotes an idea and how and when. In the case of the Cook Islands,
one important catalyst for a shift from an agricultural economy to a tourist economy was
the drive of former Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry who, as he himself has put it, "wanted
to stop bringing the fruits to the mouths and instead bring the mouths to the fruits."
Conversation with former Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Henry, April 16, 2010.
107. The relative ease of earning money within the tourism industry has also
sapped many Cook Islanders of the incentive to be innovative in other ways. I was told,
for example, that hotels on Rarotonga would have a need for the provision of local
foodstuffs, such as eggs; nevertheless, in part because of the availability of easier money,
no local Cook Islander has yet set up a domestic egg production industry that could
perform this service. In Samoa, by comparison, where the tourism industry is in its
infancy, the local people often have to be more innovative in these regards. Conversation
with Louisa Sifakula, Pacific Island Trade and Investment Commission, April 7, 2010.
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The shift to a tourist economy has had widespread consequences
for the day-to-day lives of the people on Rarotonga and Aitutaki. These
consequences are multi-layered. Following independence, Sir Albert
Henry began leading the people into a conceptual shift that
transformed the Cook Islands-and consequently the people as the
substance of the nation-into a tourist destination. As part of this
conceptual shift, cultural practices took on new meanings and cultural
articulations took on new forms. On top of these changes, many people,
overnight, went from being agriculturalists to landlords, and thereby
from being people of the land to being people of capital, with all the
related types of changes in action and consumption that have been well
documented elsewhere.10 8 In the words of one local informant, today "a
tourist dollar touches everyone here. 10 9
Lastly, technology has also played an important role in the
development of the Cook Islands' tourism-based economy. Of course,
the completion of the airport in Rarotonga in 1973 literally opened the
country to mass tourism. Other technological advances have also been
significant. For example, the internet has made it possible for
individual bungalow owners to advertise their accommodations
worldwide and therefore to manage a segment of the interaction with
the global economy/community on an individual basis. Although these
interactions are still subject to other filters of the state, such as
customs and immigration and taxation, here the individual actor gains
a tremendous amount of agency.
A corollary of this centrality of tourism is that every family on
Rarotonga-indeed nearly every individual-is engaged in, and
dependent on, the tourist industry. As such, issues affecting tourism
are widely discussed and closely followed. This mass engagement is
exemplary of the feedback mechanism that exists in popular sentiment
among the residents of the nation and the nation qua state. For
example, during 2009 and 2010, a number of internal crises shook the
Cook Islands' tourism industry, subjecting the industry to yet further
domestic debate, resulting in state-driven intervention.
The state is implicated in. other ways as well. A further
consequence of the fact that tourism is the core of the Cook Islands'
economy has been that the state has had to make sure to manage its
global interface as well as possible. In regard to other, less profitable

108.

See, e.g.,

CLUNY MACPHERSON & LA'AVASA MACPHERSON, THE WARM WINDS OF

(2010).
109. Cf. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 21, at 32 ("[Mloney touches everything.").
There are, however, fears and frustrations about who might be receiving the largest
share of each such dollar, with some locals complaining that foreign owners (because of
their profits) and/or foreign laborers (who do a good deal of the low-wage labor within
the tourism sector) might be benefitting from tourism dollars more than many local Cook
Islanders themselves.
CHANGE: GLOBALISATION IN CONTEMPORARY SAMOA
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areas of the economy, the disciplining forces of the global economy are
occasionally more forgiving, but here, the Cook Islands is forced to
compete at an extremely high level that allows less room for error. 110
Further, tourism is not only responsible for a large portion of the
country's capital accumulation, but it is also through tourism that the
global community in literal, embodied form-via the tens of thousands
of visitors per year-interfaces with the state. Consequently, through
the regulation of tourism, the Cook Islands state regulates its
interactions with the global community and the global marketplace.
(3) National Dreams and the Regulation of Off-Shore Banking and
Related Industries
Many in the Cook Islands recognize the financial precariousness
of the country's reliance on tourism. For decades, therefore, leaders and
others have searched for alternative sources of national revenue. This
search has at times strayed from the kind of long-term planning and
difficult ground work that can lay the foundation for a truly diversified
economy. Instead, some of the efforts have focused on what might be
seen as "easy money" schemes.
These schemes are, for some, a part of a national dream that
reflects the ambivalence that many Cook Islanders feel toward
economic development: there is often a desire for increased earning
power (or, more accurately, for more spending power) but with staunch
resistance to dramatic structural modifications or changes to the "way
of life" in the islands. The current debate about seabed mining is an
excellent example of this;' seabed mining is a scheme that requires
little effort but that produces high (perhaps even extremely high)
112
profits for all.

110. See Layna Mosley, Globalisationand the State: Still Room to Move?, 10 NEW
POL. ECON. 355, 355-356 (2005) [hereinafter Mosley, Globalisationand the State];Layna
Mosley, Room to Move: InternationalFinancialMarkets and National Welfare States, 54
INT'L ORG. 737, 737 (2000).
111. See, e.g., Atasa Bosevakaturaga, Deep Sea Mining has Viable Future, COOK
ISLANDS
NEWS
(Apr.
13,
2016),
http://www.cookislandsnews.com/national
/local/item/57755-deep-sea-mining-has-viable-future
[https://perma.cc/HP3W-VM9D]
(archived Sept. 7, 2016) (building on the premise that "[t]he Cook Islands could have a
viable, beneficial deep sea mineral (DSM) industry sometime in the future").
112. By contrast, note the pearl industry. Pearl farming-which occurs primarily
among the Northern Group islands-is extremely difficult work, but coming out of the
1970s it was an industry worth approximately NZD $18 million annually for the country,
second only to tourism. Now it brings in less than NZD $5 million per year. The
fluctuations of the global market - exacerbated by a flooding of cheap pearls from French
Polynesia (which I have been told has sixty or seventy islands that produce pearls for
some $180 million per year, compared to one or two islands in the Cook Islands), have
significantly harmed the ability of Cook Islanders to compete on the global market; at
the same time, the availability of money through tourism and/or wage labor in New
Zealand and Australia, has meant that few children of pearl farmers have been willing
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The primary version of this national dream in the 1980s and 1990s
involved the off-shore financial services industry. Many Cook Islanders
saw this industry as an opportunity to generate huge amounts of
revenue for the country with no greater investment than a few small
offices where, through basic office labor, fees for these off-shore
services would flood in.
Such a scheme is formed by national regulation and is dependent
on foreign capital. As such, the scheme demonstrates the sovereignty
of the nation-state as an interface mechanism. In this particular case,
the scheme is especially illustrative because it shows the active role of
the state in ways that can prove to be both beneficial and harmful; it
also serves as a sharp example of the disciplining nature of the global
market.
In short, in regard to so-called "off-shore" financial services,
national regulation and sovereignty are interwoven in several ways.
For one, national financial regulation is the sine qua non of an off-shore
banking industry. In other words, national financial regulations create
the very conditions that allow for foreign individuals and companies to
hold money in that country. At the same time, sovereignty is
continuously implicated because it is the perceived boundary of
sovereignty that prevents regulators and others in a given client's
11 3 ,
114
home country from accessing this money.

to or are interested in following in their parents' footsteps. Moreover, most of the money
from pearls is earned by the middle-men, not by the pearl farmers; one former pearl
farmer told me that the most she had received for a single pearl was NZD $32-for a
pearl that would probably sell in the store for NZD $1,000.
113. Take the example of an off-shore trust. An individual, say, an American,
deposits a million dollars in a trust managed in the Cook Islands. That individual is later
sued in the United States and is ordered by the court to pay a million dollars. Let's say
also that the individual has retained very few assets in the United States and therefore
does not have the funds, in the United States, to pay the judgment. Now, the U.S. court
can certainly order that those assets existing in the United States be forcefully
obtained--or in the case of goods, sold and the proceeds paid to the prevailing party in
the litigation. But as to the million dollars in the Cook Islands, that money cannot be
forcefully removed from the Cook Islands-because of the sovereignty of the Cook
Islands-except under very limited circumstances, and even in those cases, a court action
must be brought in the Cook Islands itself (because the Cook Islands does not recognize
foreign judgments). At the same time, regulation in the United States could wipe out this
type of off-shore trust by placing barriers to their access by U.S. citizens; in such a way,
unilateral action by one sovereign (here the United States) can have large effects on the
abilities of other sovereignties (here the Cook Islands, and the many other small
countries that profit from off-shore services) to function. See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens
and the Commercializationof State Sovereignty, 56 INT'L ORG. 151, 155 (2002).
114. Note also that Cook Islands trust laws do not recognize the rule against
perpetuities, and therefore, unlike in many U.S. jurisdictions, one can in the Cook
Islands set up dynastic trusts, that is to say, trusts that continue for generation after
generation without end.
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Sovereignty is also implicated because the fees generated by the
off-shore financial services bring revenue to the country, allowing it to
function. As such, not only the creation of, but also the support for, the
industry is a national project. The Cook Islands government, for
example, maintains an agency for the international promotion of the
country's off-shore services, the Financial Services Development
Authority. 115 As part of this national project, it is even important for
companies offering off-shore services to work together in promoting the
country's off-shore industry, even though they are otherwise competing
against each other for clients. As one financial regulator explained it,
it is like opening a restaurant-if you open it in too remote of a location,
no one will come; instead, you need a critical mass. Without that
focused critical mass of off-shore services in the Cook Islands, wouldbe clients are likely to turn to service-providers in other sovereignties,
such as in the Cayman Islands.
But off-shore services are not without risk to a country. In the
early 1990s, an international scandal broke in New Zealand, part of
which involved money managed by Cook Islands firms. Holes in the
Cook Islands' financial regulation came to light and the eventcommonly referred to as the Winebox Affair-was a black eye to the
Cook Islands. 116 This black eye was not merely symbolic, however.
Indeed, in addition to detrimental effects on tourism, the Cook Islands
was placed on international black-lists due to its financial services

115.

COOK

ISLANDS

FINANCIAL

SERVICES

DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY,

http://www.cookislandsfinance.com/, (last visited Sept. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/HJ6CLNXR] (archived Sept. 27, 2016).
116. Conrad de Aenile, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands Exploit the Australasian
Niche: Farther Offshore: South Sea Havens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/25/your-money/25iht-mcook.t.html
(subscription
required) [https://perma.cc/ZJ7P-NQJY] (archived Sept. 6, 2016) ("The reputation of the
Cooks was tarnished several years ago ... by the 'wine-box affair,' in which documents
found in a wine box implicated New Zealand companies in questionable practices using
Cook Islands legal structures. It also raised doubts about how well client confidentiality
is safeguarded ....
An investigation by New Zealand police found no wrongdoing,
however."). As the recent revelations of the so-called Panama Papers demonstrate, the
consequences of such scandals to individuals and institutions alike can be considerable.
E.g., New York Times, The Panama Papers:Here's What We Know, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/panama-papers-explainer.html?_r=O
(subscription required) [https://perma.cc/F89M-SCDR
(archived Sept. 6, 2016)
(providing background on the scandal); Raphael Minder, Spain's Industry Minister Steps
Down Over Panama Papers Revelations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/europe/panama-papers-spain.html
(subscription required) [https://perma.cc/PT4Z-7DC5] (archived Sept. 6, 2016)
(discussing the resignation of the Spanish Minister of Industry, Energy and Tourism,
Jos6 Manuel Soria, as a result of revelations made in the Panama Papers and noting
how Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson of Iceland had stepped aside a
week earlier for related reasons).
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industry, 1 7 and the Cook Islands government was forced to overhaul
its financial services laws, among others. 118 In doing so, the Cook
Islands set up its Financial Supervisory Commission 119 and its
Financial Intelligence Unit 120 to better regulate its financial services,
including more effective monitoring of cross-border transactions and
verification that given monies are legitimate and not parts of moneylaundering or other illicit schemes.
In short, the Cook Islands was playing here on the global field.
But, as noted, the disciplining powers of the global market can be
severe. The Cook Islands, in being connected to an international
scandal, was forced to bear the brunt of that discipline and, among
other things, to alter domestic regulation accordingly.
(4) The Interface Mechanism: A Few Final Examples
A few final illustrations of elements of the state that serve as
interface mechanisms may be useful here. First, an excellent direct
example can be found in the Cook Islands Business Trade Investment
Board. Pursuant to the rules of the board, as mandated by state
regulation, foreign individuals and entities wishing to make
investments within the Cook Islands are subject to a number of
restrictions. 121 Among others, foreign investors must, in many
circumstances, partner with one or more Cook Islanders and must
demonstrate a potential benefit of the investment to the Cook Islands;
the sale of local businesses must also be advertised for thirty days for
purchase by locals before the sale is opened up to foreigners. So in a

117. New Zealand Herald, Nauru Still in the Doghouse, N.Z. HERALD (Sept. 10,
2001) (explaining that as of 2001 the Cook Islands was still on the so-called OECD black
list); John Ridgway, Worldwide: The Pacific Islands Region: Being On The OECD Grey
List,
MONDAQ
(Oct.
2,
2009),
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/86952
/wealth+managementThe+Pacific+Islands+Region+Being+On+The+OECD+Grey+List
[https://perma.cc/8QHG-5KMT] (archived Sept. 6, 2016) (explaining that by 2009 the
Cook Islands was on the OECD "grey" list, which "means that whilst the OECD considers
them 'tax havens', they have substantially committed to implementing the OECD
International Tax Standard").
118. As a result, although the Cook Islands continues to permit-and to promoteits off-shore trust services, the country has largely phased out its off-shore banking
services.
119. FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION: COOK ISLANDS, http://www.fsc.gov.ck/

cooklslandsFscApp/content/home (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). [https://perma.cc/73EHJ9P7] (archived Sept. 6, 2016).
120. Cook Islands Financial Intelligence Unit, FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY
COMMISSION: COOK ISLANDS, http://www.fsc.gov.ck/cookIslandsFscApp/content/fiu (last
visited Jan. 13, 2016). [https://perma.cc/JM44-RZAQ] (archived Sept. 6, 2016).
121. Rules of Investment, BUSINESS TRUST INVESTMENT BOARD: COOK ISLANDS

http://www.btib.gov.ck/investment.php?inves id=26 (last visited
[https://perma.cc/DQR8-LH5F] (archived Sept. 6, 2016).
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very deliberate way, the state is shaping the kind of investment capital
that comes into the country and by whom.
State regulation also operates in less express ways. For instance,
the Cook Islands land tenure system, discussed in more detail below,
forbids the alienation of land.122 This is a traditional rule that is now
enforced by the state. As such, through this regulation, the state sets
the rules for the engagement between the Cook Islands and the global
marketplace in terms of the real property of the islands.
The state's regulation of education is another example of the role
of the state as an interface mechanism. In essence, the Cook Islands
has made the decision to match its educational system to that of New
Zealand-in large part to facilitate the ability of Cook Islanders to
move back and forth between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. As
such, and given that the educational system of New Zealand is
generally considered to be superior to that of the Cook Islands, the
Cook Islands state is setting up the structure of the system in such a
way so as to cause out-migration. In other words, thanks to the
correlating systems, it is easy to transfer one's children from schools in
the Cook Islands to schools in New Zealand; and given that schools in
New Zealand are seen as superior, many parents/care-givers do indeed
move to New Zealand with their children or send their children to live
with relatives in New Zealand to attend school there. The interface
mechanism in this case is then one that is structurally conducive to
out-migration.
2. Sovereignty as a Value-Maximization Mechanism
The term "value-maximization mechanism" refers to those aspects
of sovereignty by which the state regulates the movement of capital
and persons for purposes other than pure economic rationality, that is
to say, where the state regulates for reasons related to the preservation
of, promotion of, or resistance to, a given set of cultural characteristics.
This aspect of sovereignty is therefore a connector between the sui
generis, subjective cultural stuff of the nation on the one hand, and the
state's interface function on the other.
Here then, it is the state that is the arbiter of culture-or a
culturally shared sense of identity-because the decisions regarding
regulation necessarily emanate from the state. Obviously, the
individuals who perform decision-making on behalf of the state can be
influenced by broader trends and inclinations among the state's
citizens, as well as by outside forces-although the degree to which this

122.

See infra Subsection JV.A.2.a.(i).
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happens, of course, depends on the scale of democracy and other
factors. 123
If the term "culture" is defined as the sum of a group's values, then
the term "culture" may be substituted for "values" in this discussion: a
nation-state exists to most effectively reproduce its culture. 124, 125 For
instance, if language preservation is important to a group, as it is in
France and the would-be nation-state Quebec, 126 then the nationstate's capital regulation will be structured so as to support a strong
language base-laws will ban certain kinds of foreign-language
signage, even though such signage (say, advertising) might otherwise
have facilitated and promoted capital generation. 127 Compare this to
Sweden, where the use of English words and phrases-from
advertisements to movie titles 128-is rampant; here, the defense
against foreign-language intrusion is not a priority of the culture, and,
in fact, English-language usage is desired and seen as prestigious for
numerous reasons, ranging from trendiness to international
cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the value-maximization activities of the
129
Swedish state are focused elsewhere (such as on social welfare).

123. Sally Engle Merry discusses ways that the relationship between the state and
other normative orders is dialectic, mutually constitutive. Sally Engle Merry,
Anthropology, Law, and TransnationalProcesses,21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357, 358
(1992).
124. As noted above, it is of course difficult to define what a "culture" is or what its
values are. And in any event, culture is always contested, always changing.
125. It is for this reason that smaller national groups desire a "state": selfdetermination is only a part of the equation. Since no state is really independent anyway
and groups are often better off economically when not an independent state, what is
really at stake is the desire and ability for a group to define its own substance - that is
to say, "culture."
126. Quebec is an interesting example because it is not fully "independent" but still
exerts these kinds of controls.
127. See Loretta Nelms-Reyes, Comment, Deal-Making on French Terms: How
France's Legislative Crusade to Purge American Terminology From French Affects
Business Transactions, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 273, 273 (1996) ("On August 4, 1994, the
French Parliament enacted a law making the use of French mandatory in all official, and
many commercial, contexts. While this 'Loi Toubon' purports to achieve the 'cultural
objective' of promoting the French language, its impact on the international business
community could be far more significant because advertising, trademarks, product
documentation, and contracts come within the scope of the statute.").
128. In other words, although foreign-language movies are subtitled when shown in
Sweden, the titles of English-language movies-whether in advertisements or in
mainstream movie reviews-are often given and referred to simply by their English
name.
129. See Juliana Carlson, Sweden's ParentalLeave Insurance:A Policy Analysis of
Strategies to Increase Gender Equality, 40 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 63, 64-65 (2013)
("When the Swedish government, headed by the Social Democrats, introduced parental
leave insurance in 1974, it replaced the standing maternity leave policy. The legislation
provided parents financial benefits to take care of their children for up to six total
months, to be divided as decided upon by the parents.... In the 1980s and 1990s several
iterations of the parental leave legislation increased the amount of leave time to twelve
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In short, different cultural values lead to a different regulation of
capital in order to better promote those values. Here, sovereignty is
both a social glue and a social catalyst; it is the meta-term that
describes this relationship between the process of nation-state action
1 30
and cultural solicitude and regeneration.
a. Evidence from the Cook Islands
(1) Land Tenure Rules: State Regulation in Support of Cultural Norms
Land tenure rules in the Cook Islands are complex. 131 Most
pertinent for present purposes is the traditional rule that land cannot
be sold. Unlike many Indigenous peoples of the world, Cook Islanders,
through a series of historical circumstances, were able to maintain this
central rule throughout colonization.
So, until independence in 1965, the rule forbidding the alienability
of land was part of the colonial administrative code.13 2 When the Cook
Islands state took over governance of the country, the state very

months and brought the earnings-related benefits to the current level of 80% of the
income for parents working at the time of leave taking.... A second reserved month for
each parent was added in 2002, bringing the total leave time to 16 months."); Linda
White, The United States in Comparative Perspective:Maternity and ParentalLeave and
Child Care Benefits Trends in Liberal Welfare States, 21 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM 185,
190 (2010) ("When scholars look to alternative models to inform analysis of the United
States, many tend to look at Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, which have
exceedingly generous paid maternity/parental leave and [early childhood education and
care] provisions.").
130. My ideas here owe much to Layna Mosley's political science insight on "room
to move." Mosley, Globalisationand the State, supra note 110, at 357-359. There Mosley
describes the disciplining effects of globalization. In other words, the demands of the
global market will force states to conform in certain ways in order to be able to compete
in that market. But Mosley's key insight is that a state is not forced to conform in every
way; instead, in between the disciplining demands, there are also spaces where each
state has "room to move," that is to say, the ability to make its own decisions, less
impeded by the strictures of the global market. It is in these spaces that a state's valuemaximization is most significant. My debt here also goes to Aihwa Ong for highlighting
the profound productive value of different spaces, including in spaces of "exception." See
generally AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND
SOVEREIGNTY (2006).
131. For the seminal text in this regard, see generally RON CROCOMBE, LAND
TENURE IN THE COOK ISLANDS (1964).
132. Cook Islands Act 1915 §§ 467-69 (N.Z.), ("467. No person shall be capable of
making, whether by will or otherwise, and whether in favour of a Native or of a European
or of the Crown, any alienation or disposition of customary land or of any interest
therein. 468. No Native or descendant of a Native shall be capable of alienating
(otherwise than to the Crown for public purposes) Native freehold land for an estate in
fee-simple or for any other freehold interest whether legal or equitable.").
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deliberately took this administrative provision on as national law. 133
Here then is a crisp example of a state law that has encoded and
continues to encode a cultural norm (as most laws in fact do, although
13 4
often in less obvious ways).
This particular cultural norm qua state regulation is pivotally
relevant to the Cook Islands' relationship with the global community
and the global marketplace. In tandem with increasing tourism and
international mobility, the desirability of land as a target of foreign
investment by both individuals and companies has grown. In other
words, there exist potential foreign buyers of land and there would
presumably be a few sellers, but the Cook Islands state, as arbiter of
the given cultural norm, refuses to allow the sale.
This transaction-inhibiting policy has important effects on the
Cook Islands' economy in three key respects. First, the unavailability
of land for purchase naturally greatly reduces direct foreign
investment. As a partial remedy, the state has legislation that allows
for leases on land of up to sixty years. 135 As such, there is a vehicle for
foreign investment in land, for example for hotels or resorts, but the
market is relatively meager given that, unlike the value of owned land,
which typically increases with time, a lease in land tends to lose value
each year.
Second, the land tenure rules in place mean that many, many
members of a family often have a say in the use of a larger plot of land.

133. See generally, COOK ISLANDS CONST., supra note 81, at art. 77 ("Subject to the
provisions of this Constitution - (a) The existing law shall, until repealed, and subject to
any amendment thereof, continue in force on and after Constitution Day; (b) All rights,
obligations, and liabilities arising under the existing law shall continue to exist on and
after Constitution Day, and shall be recognised, exercised, and enforced accordingly.").
Brian Mason, Opinion, The Cook Islands Act 1915 - Still Strong After 100 Years, COOK
ISLANDS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.cookislandsnews.com/item/54416-the-cookislands-act-1915-still-strong-after-100-years/54416-the-cook-islands-act-1915-stillstrong-after-100-years [https://perma.cc/2FBL-MUUH] (archived Sept. 7, 2016) ("For
nearly every matter of governance except for Customs, the Cook Islands Act 1915 was a
Code. This colossus ran to 660 sections and nearly 100 pages.... Over time separate
statutes have been enacted to deal with matters such as crimes. But remarkably, the
core provisions of the Act relating to native land remain largely unchanged a century on
from their passage into law.").
134. See, e.g., JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE AND
POWER (1998).
135. Cook Islands Act, supra note 132, at § 469 ("(1.) No Native or descendant of a
Native shall be capable of alienating (otherwise than to the Crown) Native freehold land
whether by way of lease, license, easement, right of taking the profits thereof, or
otherwise howsoever, for a longer term (including any term or terms of renewal to which
the lessee, licensee, or other alienee may be entitled) than sixty years computed from the
time when the alienation takes effect in possession according to the tenor thereof. ... (3.)
Subject to the provisions of this section as to the maximum duration thereof, every such
alienation may confer upon the lessee, licensee, or other alienee a right of renewal for
one or more terms.").
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So efforts to put larger plots of land to productive/commercial usewhether for tourism or agriculture or otherwise-frequently fail
because it proves impossible to get the necessary agreement from all
the implicated family members in regard to any particular proposed
project.
A third way that the state's regulation against the alienability of
land affects the Cook Islands' economy involves the ability of Cook
Islanders themselves to generate capital for reasons such as starting a
small business. In the United States, just as in countries like New
Zealand from which the Cook Islands inherited the backbone of its
capitalist economy, a primary vehicle for obtaining capital for starting
a small business is by means of a loan for which one's residence serves
as collateral. But this avenue is largely unavailable for Cook
Islanders. 136
So, the state's land tenure regulation violates rules of economic
rationality, but it does so deliberately and with targeted intentions and
results. And indeed, in doing so, it is able to preserve a central tenet of
Cook Islands culture even in the face of the forces of the global economy
that are as disciplining as they may be enticing. Time and again,
informants discussed with me the centrality of land tenure to their
understandings of Cook Island-ness. So the state, in prohibiting
alienability, as well as in offering the alternative of sixty-year leases,
is serving in its sovereign role as a value-maximization mechanism.
(2) Tourism: A Delicate Balance
As discussed earlier, tourism is the mainstay of the Cook Islands'
economy. The relationship, however, between the Cook Islands state
and the running of the islands' tourism is a complex one. On the one
hand, of course, the state wishes to-and tries to-increase tourism
and thereby increase the revenue from tourism. On the other hand,
however, the state limits tourism for the purposes of preserving and
protecting cultural norms.1 3 7 One example of this is the land tenure
regulation described directly above: if land were alienable, then a likely
consequence would be more [foreign-owned] hotels and resorts, which
would presumably boost tourist numbers, perhaps even dramatically.

136. In addition to the direct inability to loan money in this way, some informants
pointed out to me that there is also a qualitative difference in borrowing money in other
ways, such as in a bank loan: when defaulting on one's loan means that one will likely
lose one's home, there is an added incentive to work hard to make profitable the money
borrowed by the loan so that one can pay the loan back.
137. As one Pacific investment advisor reminded me, the Cook Islands is obviously
not alone in wanting to increase foreign investment/tourism but without losing its
culture or being overrun.
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Other aspects of state regulation also, directly or indirectly, limit
tourism. For instance, the state-regulated minimum wage in the Cook
Islands is higher than in many other Pacific island nations. These
higher wages are a necessity in order to keep Cook Islander workers
from leaving the country, given Cook Islanders' easy access to a better
standard of living in New Zealand and Australia. 13 8 Nevertheless, with
higher wages come higher prices, which cause tourist visits to the Cook
Islands to cost more for the tourist than a visit to many other sunny
island states in the region, serving as a disincentive to many potential
visitors.
Furthermore, tourism demands the availability of goods and
services in timeframes that correspond with tourists' needs. However,
the combination of cultural norms that value non-work time and
regulations requiring overtime pay mean that these needs are at times
poorly met: most shops in Rarotonga close by 4pm on weekdays, noon
on Saturdays (if they open at all), and are closed on Sundays. It is not
uncommon to see tourists in town after these hours, searching with
some significant effort, though in vain, for places to spend their money.
A more visible example involves cruise ships. Cruise ships usually
visit Rarotonga for one day only, and that day is sometimes a
Sunday. 13 9 Even though the residents are generally informed well in
advance of the arrival of any cruise ship, only a tiny percentage of
shops open on a Sunday when cruise ship passengers are on the island
(similarly, after noon on a Saturday). In such instances, literally
hundreds of well-financed visitors are on the island, cash seemingly
falling out of their pockets, but, in spite of their eager endeavors, these
tourists are unable to find many places to exchange that cash for local
goods or services.
Here again, state regulation serves to maximize key cultural
ideals, even at the expense of "economic rationality." Because what is
the cost of these closed shops? As Cook Islanders are smartly aware,
the answer is, among other things, more time with family, more time
with friends, more time enjoying life rather than earning it. The
mathematical complexities of the global economy be damned, it is, for
many Cook Islanders, actually quite a simple calculation.
In a similar vein, a rise in the number of tourists to Rarotonga
would require significant changes to existing infrastructure: roads
would need to be repaved and even widened, buildings would need to

138. At writing, the minimum wage in the Cook Islands, at NZD $6.25/hour, is still
far less than those of New Zealand and Australia, which are NZD $14.75/hour and AUD
$17.29/hour respectively.
139. For more on cruise ship tourism and economic development in the South
Pacific, see generally Cluny Macpherson, Golden Goose or Trojan Horse? Cruise Ship
Tourism in PacificDevelopment, 49 ASIA PAC. VIEWPOINT 185 (2008).
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be constructed, other services-such as, perhaps, a casino-might need
to be offered. But these are steps that many Cook Islanders are opposed
to because of the toll they would take on the character of Rarotonga.
So, although a vast majority of the people articulate a desire for
"economic development," often in the stated form of expanded tourism,
very few claim that they want Rarotonga to be transformed in the
physical sense necessary to support such tourism or that they would
welcome the changes to the local dynamic that more tourism would
cause. As a consequence, the state, as manager of national tourism,
works to increase tourism in smaller numbers but without a full-scale
effort to push the numbers to their full possibility. Once more, the land
and the cultural norms of daily lifestyle are the beneficiaries of state
regulation at the expense of direct foreign income via the global
market.
As this latter example shows, the state, therefore, often has an
ambiguous-and a nearly always contested-role in the process of
value maximization. Another example relates to the preservation of the
Cook Islands Maori language, as language is such an important
element and marker of culture. On the one hand, the state has
mandated, among other things, a Maori language requirement in the
country's primary schools. On the other hand, as noted, the state has
purposefully aligned the Cook Islands school system with that of New
Zealand, a maneuver that facilitates the move of Cook Islander
children from the Cook Islands to New Zealand-a New Zealand where
children are unlikely to get any school instruction at all in Cook Islands
Maori.
Importantly, the school itself is, of course, a key institutional
implementation of the values of the state. In the case of the Cook
Islands, the Maori language requirement and the inclusion of various
dancing and related cultural activities at school are illustrations of
ways that the state, through its role as value-maximization
mechanism, literally trains its children in the valued ways of
culture. 140
Returning to the question of language, English is tolerated or even
encouraged in many areas of public life in the Cook Islands. The state
possesses the power to mandate Maori in many situations, but chooses
not to. This choice is not made without forethought or without
understanding its significance; instead, unlike the situation in regard
to land tenure, the state in this circumstance chooses to sacrifice
aspects of the culturally important realm of language in exchange for
the perceived benefits that come with having citizens who are fluent in
the language of the two closest sources of labor and money for

140. See also Anne Allison, Japanese Mothers and Obent6s: The Lunch-Box as
Ideological State Apparatus, 64 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 195 (1991).
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emigrating families, namely New Zealand and Australia. For many
Cook Islanders, the sacrifice is a worthwhile one; as a staunchly proCook Islands father, who nevertheless spoke primarily English instead
of Maori to his children, told me poignantly: "No doctor is ever going to
ask for the scalpel in the Maori language. 14 1
B. The Emotional Component of Sovereignty
As the insightful scholar Benedict Anderson, among others, has
asked, why is it that individuals are frequently willing to die for their
142
country, rather than, typically, for their city, county, or continent?
That is, why is the nation-state frequently the primary political body
with which individuals identify?
There is something special about sovereignty that cannot be
explained by quantitative measures. The other component of
contemporary nation-state sovereignty is therefore inherently
emotional. And, like all things emotional, this emotional component of
sovereignty is both individualized and lacking in clear boundaries. In
a nutshell, this aspect of sovereignty is the cultural magic that makes
sovereignty collective, that renders the whole larger than the sum of
its individual parts, the fusion whereby human allegiance and affection
form a sacred bond superior to Western forms of logic. It is like-and
most likely akin to-the magic that makes family relationships more
important than other relationships. (It should come as no surprise that
the fraternit6of love for a brother is, in European vocabulary at least,
the same term as the brotherhood said to be felt among a nation's
citizens.) As researchers, we cannot know what inspired the first
siblings or the first cousins or the first second-cousins to initially feel
the affections of a familial bond (although, to be sure, we can make a
guess); similarly, we cannot know what stirred the first would-be
citizens to emotional allegiance to their nation-state (though again, we
can make a guess). Whatever the case, we are at a moment where such
relationships exist and can be studied.
Significantly, we can describe in categorical terms the contours of
the emotional side of sovereignty, yet the contents of those contours for
each nation are unique for each group; they are sui generis. In other
words, for some groups sovereignty is born of the land, for others it is
an outgrowth of kinship and ethnicity, and for still others, it is the
loyalty to a set of rights and a rule of law. So, even though nation-states
have come to take on commensurate forms, the substance that

141. Interview notes on file with Author.
142. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 9-10 (2d ed. 1983).
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animates those forms is generally different. This emotional 143
component of sovereignty therefore involves the subjective, local
1
understandings of sovereignty. "
Indeed, sovereignty has meaning for people. In the middle of my
fieldwork, I took to asking Cook Islanders the un-politically correct
question of whether the Cook Islands would not just be better off if it
simply became a part-whether state or territory-of New Zealand. (It
is almost beyond question that if the Cook Islands became a part of
New Zealand, it would become better off economically.) With almost no
exception, I was told that this was a bad idea because the consequence
of the Cook Islands being a part of New Zealand would be that Cook
Islanders would cease to be Cook Islanders. To which I always retorted:
are not the tens of thousands of Cook Islanders who already live in New
Zealand still Cook Islanders even though they reside within New
Zealand's borders? I was never, however, given credit for this smug
tour de force of logic because my question missed the whole point:
sovereignty matters in part because of what it means to the people
themselves, because of the subjective, emotional qualities that it
inspires.
This emotional component permeates innumerable aspects of
daily and ceremonial life. This component of sovereignty derives in part
from the mechanics of the state, but these emotional attachments
continuously impact those mechanics. A salient illustration can be seen
in the case of Iceland. A small nation-state of some 330,000
inhabitants, the country was hit especially hard by the 2008 global
financial crisis. 145 The reason for Iceland's particular vulnerability

143. Barry Barclay has written about the way that using terms like "intellectual
property" in regard to creations by Indigenous persons instantly recategorizes what
might be an Indigenous understanding of what the thing is to a Western one (namely,
property). At the same time, when such objects enter the global marketplace they
generally become property precisely in the Western sense. BARRY BARCLAY, MANA
TUTUTU: MAORI TREASURES & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2005). The emotional

component of sovereignty entails a similar phenomenon: every group on the globe
maintains an Indigenous, sui generis understanding of the sources and character of its
relationships with its nation-state; nevertheless, given that all nation-states are
connected in the constellation of globalization, those Indigenous understandings are, in
the connections to the global, translated into a form of sovereignty that is the same for
all nation-states.
144. As Sir Geoffrey Henry, former prime minister of the Cook Islands, said to me:
"Sovereignty has to come from the inside too. It's not just a flag. It's an internal belief, a
conviction." Conversation with former Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Henry, April 16,
2010. In his inimitable style, Sir Geoffrey also said that the longer Cook Islanders are
away from the islands, the more "the scent of sovereignty diminishes."
145. See Birgir Petursson & Andrew P. Morriss, Global Economies, Regulatory
Failure, and Loose Money: Lessons for Regulating the Finance Sector from Iceland's
FinancialCrisis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 691, 693, 695 (2011) ("By 2004, the Icelandic economy
appeared as strong as any in the world, Iceland was widely touted as an example of how
a small open economy could succeed, and Iceland was the sixth wealthiest country in the
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stemmed from the loose regulation that the state, until that time, had
imposed on its domestic banks. 146 A recovery from their financial
straits therefore required an overhaul of this banking regulation.
Three primary options were considered: restricting domestic banks to
operation within Iceland, integrating banking regulation and scope
with other Nordic states, or integrating banking regulation and scope
with the European Union. 147 Significantly, the debate about these
options centered not only on the potential economic benefits of each
alternative but also on the question of who Icelanders felt they were
and wanted to be: isolationist, Nordic, or European. In other words,
rather than arising in a vacuum, or even in a test-tube of economic
rationality, the push was to enact banking regulations that reflected
Icelandic identity. The emotional component of sovereignty drove
corresponding changes to the functional/instrumental component.
Furthermore, it is possible to say as to this emotional component
that it has an inherent element and a cultural element. In short, the
experience of emotional supra-familial group attachment is somehow
inherently human-immutable-because it exists in all cultures. In
the Cook Islands, for example, that pre-colonial attachment was tribal.
An additional element, however, is cultural-and therefore mutablebecause the scope, strength, and contours of this supra-familial
attachment are arbitrary. Again in the case of the Cook Islands, tribal
attachments have become shattered into multi-pronged attachments
that include tribe, village, island, and nation-state.

world as measured by GDP per capita." However, "[bly October 1, 2008, Iceland's
currency had lost all of its prior gains and more, falling well below its 2001 value against
all major currencies; its three major banks had collapsed and been essentially
nationalized; leading investors and businessmen were in or on the verge of bankruptcy;
the United Kingdom had invoked anti-terrorism legislation to seize local Icelandic
assets; the Icelandic government, politically isolated home and abroad, was being
pressured to accept responsibility for ISK 340 billion in foreign depositors' accounts in
the banks, a debt equivalent to 17% of GDP; and the repayment obligation provoked a
political crisis in Iceland ....).
146. See id.,
at 694, 697-98 (explaining how, in the early 2000s, "Iceland was a
success, a poster child for deregulation, sustainability, and open economic policies." But
with the global financial crisis, "[f]inancial regulators both in Iceland and elsewhere were
caught off-guard by the impact of [the dramatic increase in global liquidity], which
transformed Iceland's deregulation of a primarily domestic banking industry into an
event that ultimately had international significance.").
147. See Kristin Loftsd6ttir, The Loss of Innocence: the Icelandic Financial Crisis
and Colonial Past, 26 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 9, 9 (2010) (discussing the effects that the
global financial crisis had on Icelandic identity through an anthropological lens).
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1. Evidence from the Cook Islands
a. Fault Lines: The Growing Pains of Nation-Building
What makes the Cook Islands possible as a sovereignty is not
solely its existence as an administrative jurisdiction. Instead, what
truly makes Cook Islands sovereignty possible is the on-going
transformation of Cook Islanders' emotional attachments from
focusing on individual islands to encompassing the group of fifteen
islands together, as one whole-as a sovereign entity.
The Cook Islands, after all, is a political project. It is a puzzle piece
carved out of an unbelievably large swath-thousands of square
miles-of the oceanic fabric that makes up Polynesia. This metaphor
of a puzzle piece is apt. Each piece is only one portion of the total
picture of Polynesia; alone, it neither represents nor speaks to the
diversity that the region comprises. At the same time, its lines are
arbitrary, drawn by the hand of man [sic] with an eye to overall fit-a
complement to the surrounding puzzle pieces whose contours
themselves had already been awkwardly shoehorned into an existing
framework.
As such, the Cook Islands is an arbitrary nation. Although the
people of its many islands are related by both genetics and culture, the
peoples' historical allegiances usually extended only-at most-to the
shores of their own islands. While trading and intermarriage occurred
to some extent, such relationships, with a few exceptions for close
islands like Manihiki and Rakahanga, generally took place through
alliances rather than unions.
Nevertheless, the Cook Islands has made tremendous progress in
nation-building. To some degree, this is due to the hard work and
creative-perhaps intuitive-ingenuity of a small number of key
political leaders, not to mention the enabling framework of the
globalized discourse of nation-building that became increasingly
pervasive following World War II. One cannot, however, erase
overnight the overlapping cultural and political divisions that have
marked the islands for generations, for centuries even. The residue of
these divisions is still experienced and reproduced on multiple levels:
Islands. As noted, historical differences exist between most of the
individual islands. Importantly, those differences have engendered a
strong island-specific loyalty among most of the inhabitants (a loyalty
that is, however, often compromised by village-specific loyalties within
the island social structure).
Northern Group/Southern Group. The Northern Group of islands
and the Southern group of islands are separated by a wide stretch of
Pacific Ocean. The majority of the population resides in the Southern
Group, mostly on the main island of Rarotonga. Beyond the lingering
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pre-colonial allegiances to one's own island, there is also a pre-existing
cultural divide between the Northern Group and the Southern Group.
It was, in fact, not until the work of the London Missionary Society in
the 1800s that more systematic social connections were put in place
between the two island groups. 148
Rarotonga as capital. The decision to make Rarotonga the
administrative hub of the Cook Islands unit exacerbated the preexisting divide between the islands and the island groups by skewing
the balance of power. These shifts came in three successive stages. The
first was the appropriation of direct and indirect political power. In
becoming the capital, Rarotonga was able to co-opt elements of the
colonists' power at the expense of the other islands, especially those in
the Northern Group with whom the Rarotongans, due to culture and
geography, already had the most distant relationships. Given that
nearly all the colonial administrators, typically men, were physically
located in Rarotonga, 149 they were most likely to develop personal
relationships with Rarotongans, even marrying local women. These
relationships, while further biasing the colonial administrators in
favor of Rarotonga, also made the administrators more susceptible to
influence by the Rarotongans, to the detriment of the Outer Islanders.
Second, the political preeminence of Rarotonga quickly
transformed Rarotonga into the economic hub of the country. The
administrative operation, due to its presence alone, spurred economic
development. More importantly, however, outsiders-generally New
Zealanders and some British-were enticed to settle in Rarotonga and
open businesses there. These foreigners were often part of the colonial
administration or originally came to the island to do business with the
administrators; of course, others came by chance, in escape from other
dilemmas or were drawn to the island by the picture, already long
established, of Polynesia as a land of warmth and exoticness (including
150
exotic women).
That these many would-be and wanton entrepreneurs should land
in Rarotonga rather than in the Outer Islands was natural, given not
only the administrative presence there but also the fact that Rarotonga
was already becoming the transportation entryway to the colony as a
whole. The process was cyclic: with the arrival of each new
European, 151 whether administrator or not, the need for goods and

148. See SISSONS, supra note 77, at 12.
149. As a possible unconscious reflection of Rarotonga's status as a place larger than
its islandness, Cook Islanders generally refer to location on the island of Rarotonga as
"in" Rarotonga rather than "on" Rarotonga; note too that in common discourse,
Rarotonga is most often referred to as "Raro."
150. See NICOLE, supra note 66.
151. In local parlance, white people, whether from Europe or New Zealand,
Australia or America, are all referred to as "Europeans," even in contemporary speech.
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services targeted toward Europeans increased; as the need for goods
and services targeted toward Europeans increased, additional
Europeans were lured to Rarotonga to fill the need.
Third, the opening of the country's first international airport in
Rarotonga in 1973 sealed Rarotonga's position-symbolically and
physically-as the hub and gate-keeper of the Cook Islands politically,
economically, and in regard to the flow of goods and services. With the
subsequently growing importance of air transportation, the Outer
Islands (with some exception for Aitutaki) became increasingly
dependent on Rarotonga for the provision of both political and abstract
benefits. That dependency now includes the actual delivery of goods
and the ability of individuals-whether residents or visitors (along
with whatever kind of economic benefit they might bring with them)to go to or to leave each Outer Island. In so many ways, Rarotonga
continues to be the "center" of the Cook Islands.
An understanding of the emotional aspects of sovereignty in the
Cook Islands therefore requires an appreciation of the extent to which
the country's nation-building has taken place through two symbiotic
processes. The first is this positioning of Rarotonga as the political
center, as the policy-maker as well as spokesperson, of the greater
nation. The second is the resistance to Rarotonga that continues to
subtly animate the allegiances of Outer Islanders. As such, nationbuilding in the Cook Islands is not a linear flow toward unity but
instead is subject to some potential diversion from fourteen directions.
Nevertheless, regardless of competing island allegiances, and
although formed in the foundry of colonialism, the idea of the Cook
Islands as a single nation is making successful headway. The
accomplishments of the islands in cohering is, in measurable part, due
to the work and ingenuity of the first Prime Minister of the Cook
Islands, Sir Albert Henry. Although his career was later torpedoed by
the very dynamics that created it-politics-his charismatic efforts to
lead the Cook Islands from the yoke of colonial rule still echo in
contemporary articulations of the state.
Two important aspects of Albert Henry's influence are especially
relevant here. First, he possessed immense political savvy in terms of
understanding the opportunities created by the changing global order.
He did not blindly urge the people forward toward an imagined
salvation of "independence" simply for the sake of independence.
Instead, he helped set up the foundation for the Cook Islands' savvy
relationship with New Zealand that still exists, in more sophisticated
form, today.
Second, Henry had a compelling sense of cultural pride that
simultaneously served as anchor and rallying cry for the young nation.
With fervent persuasiveness, he was able to lift the nation by its
bootstraps by revitalizing a cultural pride that had been increasingly
chipped away during several prior generations. Indeed, during those
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previous generations, Cook Islanders had been expressly taught-and,
internalizing the message, taught themselves-that the papa'a,15 2 the
white people, were simply smarter, always superior to the Cook
Islanders themselves. Henry therefore set in motion a rejection not
only of foreign political dominance but also of perceptions of outsiders'
cultural superiority.
Cook Islanders, however, have tended to polarize around political
questions, and Albert Henry was not without his ardent critics. In
1978, he was engulfed-many would say ensnared-in scandal and
was forced from office. In the turbulent currents of those early days,
when the trajectory of the nation was still unclear, Dr. Thomas Davislater, Sir Tom-took over the helm. In the counterpoint of politics, he
was a man with starkly different ambitions and approaches than
Albert Henry.
Whereas Henry had guided the nation under the flag of cultural
pride and cultural difference, Davis brought an economic practicality
to the table.15 3 The strategies set in motion under Davis' leadership,
like those under Henry's, continue in various forms in the current era.
Indeed, the political parties led by Albert Henry and Thomas Davis
respectively remain the core parties of the Cook Islands political
system.
Furthermore, the periods of leadership under Henry and Davis,
while laying the foundation for all politics that followed, were still
marked by the precariousness of early nation-building. It was not until
the 1990s, and the ascent to power of Albert Henry's cousin, Geoffrey
Henry-later, Sir Geoffrey-that the contemporary era of Cook Islands
politics began. Faced with financial crises that threatened the very
existence of the nation, Geoffrey Henry successfully steered the
country from the instability of youth, a youth that had been marked by
qualities of na'vet6, idealism, and inexperience.
To do so, Geoffrey Henry was forced to cut public sector
employment by two-thirds and to reduce remaining public sector
salaries by up to 50 percent,15 4 propelling substantial numbers of Cook
Islanders into unemployment and spurring mass emigration to New
Zealand. At the same time, however, Geoffrey Henry was not only a
fervent advocate of Cook Islands independence but also possessed, like
his cousin Albert Henry before him, an insightful political savvy in

152. Papa'ais the Cook Islands Maori word for white people and white things. The
word is filled with complex sets of meanings-perhaps symbolic of the complexity of
white/Cook Islander relationships over the years. The word itself means "four layers,"
which, although of unknown origin, is thought to possibly refer to the many layers of
clothing that the original European explorers wore when they first arrived in the islands.
153. See SISSONS, supra note 77, at 93.
154. Id. at 118.
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terms of his domestic constituents as well as in regard to New Zealand
and other international actors.
During these crises, the Cook Islands experienced the postnascent shock of the fickle global market and was forced toward the
financial discipline required of modern states. Still, in this brutally
disciplinary move, the Cook Islands solidified itself further as a nationstate of international character. In 2001, for example, the Cook Islands
signed a Joint Centenary Declaration with New Zealand, which, while
purporting only to "restate" the nature of the relationship between
New Zealand and the Cook Islands, actually served to cement the Cook
Islands' independent status. 155
So, although it does not fit neatly into Westphalian notions of
independence, the Cook Islands' independent status in fact exists by
virtue of-and thanks to-the ties that the Cook Islands maintains
with New Zealand. At the same time, independence exists in the hearts
of Cook Islanders, an emotional attachment to this young, budding
nation-state. In other words, Cook Islanders inherited from the
capricious hands of colonialism an arbitrary array of somewhat
mismatching islands and peoples. In that process, the contours of the
state were fixed. But rather than a federation (or a state of
dysfunction), the Cook Islands has become a largely successful and
unified nation-state. That success, while building on the political
boundaries that the state was heir to, 156 is expressly due to the
development of an emotional attachment on the part of the Cook
Islands people to the Cook Islands as a cohesive nation-state which
they identify with and belong to.
b. Articulations of Emotional Sovereignty
The emotional element of sovereignty, like the idea of "nation," is
not a single, bounded one. Instead, sovereignty exists in a myriad of
sentiments. It is important to examine some of these many factors and
not simply rely on commonly attributed rubrics such as language.
Indeed, language in the Cook Islands is as much, if not more of a
shibboleth to distinguish the islands as it is a grammar to unify them.
The following sections discuss several examples of how, in the Cook

155. As one salient example, the Declaration expressly refers to the Cook Islands
as a "sovereign and independent state." Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of
the Relationship Between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, Cook Islands-N.Z., June
11, 2001. My thanks to former High Commissioner Mike Mitchell for pointing me to
many of the nuances of this agreement.
156. For a general discussion of the ways that traditions can be invented and
mobilized in nation-building, see generally THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds., 1983).
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Islands, "nation" becomes articulated in ways that lead to the
157
production and re-production of emotional sovereignty:
Politics. As discussed above, the Cook Islands nation itself was
born in the arena of politics, where Albert Henry and Thomas Davis
translated a nascent nationalism into the preconceived structure of the
nation-state even within the unique relationship that they established
between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. Recall that the two
political parties begotten by Henry and Davis continue to both drive
and polarize the Cook Islands today. In the dialectics of the opposition
of these two parties comes the centripetal force of national sentiment.
Sports. Sports are of great significance in the Cook Islands. 158 It
should perhaps come as no surprise that Geoffrey Henry, one of the key
architects of modern Cook Islands sovereignty, later segued from
politics into a role in Cook Islands sports. As President of the Cook
Islands Sports and National Olympic Committee, Henry continued to
influence Cook Islands sovereignty on the global stage as well as in the
hearts and minds of Cook Islanders.
Sport affects emotional sovereignty in several ways. First, of
course, there are the Cook Islands sports teams that inspire loyalty. In
the process of cheering on "their" "national" team, Cook Islander
supporters both internalize and reinforce the idea of the Cook Islands
nation as a cohesive entity. Second, Cook Islanders in New Zealand
and Australia have established a variety of sports clubs and leagues,
ranging from rugby for men to netball for women. In these clubs,
established and operated under the banner of Cook Island-ness, the
nation becomes reproduced in the very actions and activities of the
sports groups. Similarly, Cook Islanders from New Zealand and
Australia participate together with resident Cook Islanders on
national teams such as the Cook Islands netball team, competing
against teams from other countries.
Third, sport gives the Cook Islands the opportunity to relate on
equal (team versus team/individual versus individual) terms with
other nation-states. Even the title alone, for instance, "Cook Islands vs.
Fiji," posits the nation as always already existing in the form of the
modern nation-state, interpellating Cook Islanders as members of this
preconceived community.
Fourth, in addition to competing, sport has given the Cook Islands
the opportunity to host international sporting events. 159 As hosts, the

157. See also CATTELINO, supra note 93.
158. Among the most popular are rugby, netball, and rowing.
159. One noteworthy example is the hosting of the Pacific Mini Games in 2009. See
PACIFIC MINI GAMES 2009, http://www.foxsportspulse.com/assoc-page.cgi?c=0-4592-0-00&sID=53098 (last visited Sept. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/AXU4-MD5K] (archived
Sept. 7, 2016).

20161

A NEW MODEL OF SOVEREIGNTY

'1099

nation has presented itself as a coherent Cook Islands nation-state
and, in the process, has engendered emotional attachment to a
coherent nation.
Fifth, changes to the demographic make-up of professional rugby
leagues in Australia and New Zealand have meant that the teams, once
almost exclusively white, have, over the past decade, been transformed
by a solidly growing presence of Pacific Islanders, including Cook
Islanders. The success of Cook Islander players like brothers Kevin Iro
and Tony Iro have painted the canvas of emotional sovereignty with
the brush of national pride.
Dancing and drumming. Cook Islands dancing and drumming are
"traditional" cultural practices that have become adapted-if not
occasionally reinvented-in contemporary contexts.160 Like language,
dancing and drumming both divide and unify. On the one hand, their
performance reproduces different practices among the islands, serving
as reminders, like linguistic dialects, of differences between the
islands. But, on the other hand, dancing and drumming can be
cohesion-building. For example, the most important national holiday
in the Cook Islands is Constitution Day (Te Maeva Nui). A high point
of the week-long Constitution Day celebrations is a dance competition
between troupes from the different islands. 161 As such, the differences
between the islands serve as a catalyst for nation-building because the
differences are both articulated and performed as an element of the
nation.
Similar performances occur elsewhere inside and outside the Cook
Islands, such as at the Pasifika Festival, a yearly one-day event held
in Auckland, New Zealand. The Pasifika Festival showcases crafts,
food, and performances from many of the main island groups of the
South Pacific and attracts upwards of 200,000 visitors annually. 162
There, dance groups from many of the Cook Islands' different islands
perform both within the context of Cook Island-ness and as
representatives of the entire nation.
In regard to these dancing and drumming events in New Zealand
and Australia, which are anchoring activities for many Cook Islanders,

160. See generally KALISSA ALEXEYEFF, DANCING FROM THE HEART: MOVEMENT,
GENDER, AND COOK ISLANDS GLOBALIZATION (2009); cf THE INVENTION OF TRADITION,
supra note 156.

161. To highlight the universal importance of dance to Cook Islanders: a prominent
ex-pat government official told me the story of how he had been in Rarotonga several
years ago during the Constitution Day celebrations. While in the middle of the crowd, he
overheard some Cook Islanders-large "rugby-looking blokes"-saying things like, "I
think we're going to beat Penrhyn his year, but Aitutaki sure do look strong ....
At
first, he had assumed they were talking about rugby; but no, as it turned out, they were
discussing the inter-island dance competition!
162. See Pasika Festival 2017, AUCKLAND, http://www.aucklandnz.com/pasifika
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/R947-RXYJ (archived Sept. 7, 2016).
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two different but related phenomena are taking place. First, Cook
Islands dancing and drumming are not just dancing/drumming per se
but are a symbol of the panoply of aspects that Cook Islanders feel are
important to Cook Islands culture, ranging from language to family to
food to heritage and tradition-all of which become reproduced at
dancing and drumming performances. It is in part for this symbolic
value that dancing and drumming are so valued. Second, dancing and
drumming, in this form of community performances, serve as a
practical mechanism for bringing the community together, the result
of which is the sharing of, reinforcement of, and teaching/learning of
the full breadth of Cook Island-ness, that is to say, Cook Islands culture
in the various forms noted a few lines above for their symbolic worth:
language, family, food, heritage, and tradition. Dancing and
drumming, therefore, are valued not just for their own sake but also
because they help to perpetuate Cook Islands culture, a process that
occurs through the actual dancing and drumming, as well as, or
perhaps even more so, through the contexts that their performance
163
generates.

The concept of emotional sovereignty expresses the idea of the
nation as it exists for a given people. Of course, the idea is different for
many individuals within that larger group. Nations are able to function
as nation-states, however, because-by history, chance, or political
engineering-there is frequently enough of an overlap among the
different individual ideas to create a cohesive core regarding what most
of the citizens think that the nation is. In other situations, enough
citizens are able to get out of the nation what they hope to or expect to
so that they continue their emotional allegiance to that nation; or such
attachment can exist by default where the state or circumstances will
not permit citizens to leave.
Whatever the case, a people's idea of their nation also impacts
what the nation is and how it operates. The emotional component and
the functional component of sovereignty are therefore symbiotic; they
exist together, they influence each other. In short, people have an
emotional attachment to their state, which affects the functioning of
the state in relevant ways. Of course, what those emotional
attachments are, and how and to what degree those emotions sway
state leaders, is different in every instance. But, whatever the case, one
way or another-through support or resistance-people's subjective

163. There are other events which serve as similar catalysts for cohesion, such as
church services and other church events, as well as weddings and funerals, family
reunions, and, for some Cook Islanders, hair-cutting ceremonies.
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engagements with the state, the emotional component of sovereignty,
will influence the functioning of the state. At the same time, the state's
functional regulation will impact the people's emotional attachments,
altering their collectively shared sense of identity.
C. A Few Additional Comments: Seemingly Incongruous Articulations
of Sovereignty and So-Called "FailedStates"
Be all this as it may, how does one explain the curious and
seemingly incongruous articulations of sovereignty that occur around
the world? For example, why did the republics of the former Yugoslavia
fight so hard for something called sovereignty only to appear to
immediately plead to give up that sovereignty-sovereign borders,
sovereign currency, et cetera-by applying for membership in the
164
European Union?
This Article suggests that there are three related reasons that
groups-whether former Yugoslav republics, Indigenous tribes, or
otherwise-call their struggle one for "sovereignty." First,
"sovereignty" serves as a marker of group identity. It is a label that
validates the group's subjective, emotional understandings of itself. It
is therefore a slogan of identity and a rubric of meaning. Second, that
meaning then often gets mapped onto the form of the nation-state. This
is because it is the nation-state, as an interface mechanism, that has
become the primary form of globalized social and commercial
interaction. In this way, nation-states have-largely by default-taken
on the form of a globally-recognized "ideal" mode of social organization.
Groups therefore often tend to reach for that "ideal." Third, in order to
perpetuate the elements of culture that gave the group meaning in the
first place-in other words, to reproduce their subjective
understandings of identity-groups require, not self-determination for
its own sake, but instead control over the value-maximization
mechanism that allows them to manage, in functional terms, the
values-the subjective meanings-of the group.
Sovereignty, then, serves as an umbrella term for a variety of
desired powers and attributes, and, as such, can be a compelling
rallying cry. But the term "sovereignty" is also, in common discourse,
ambiguous,
often
mistakenly
associated
with ideas like

164. E.g., Dan Bilefsky, Joyous Croatia Joins Europe Amid a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/europe/croatia-joins-europeanunion.html?_r=l (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/43FX-EPTF] (archived Sept.
7, 2016) ("Croatia became the 28th member of the European Union on Monday, a joyous
moment for the small, predominantly Roman Catholic country about 20 years after it
won independence in the bloody wars of the Balkans. . .. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia - nations carved from the former Yugoslavia
- are all hoping to join the bloc. Slovenia joined in 2004.").
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"independence." Sovereignty is not independence, nor do most groups
want to be fully independent (that is to say, severed from all interaction
with outside groups). So, having achieved what many call
"sovereignty," a group must then focus on managing that sovereigntywhich is to say, to put in place its interface mechanisms and set up its
value-maximization mechanisms in ways that the group considers to
be beneficial. The former Yugoslav republics, for example, have
determined that the best way to perform this management is as part
of the European Union. As such, it might appear that they are
abdicating some of their "sovereignty," but, in reality, they are simply
working to manage it effectively. This Article argues that this
management of relationships is precisely what sovereignty in the
contemporary era is.
An additional objection might be raised in regard to so-called
"failed states"-those jurisdictions where the state's presence is so thin
that arguably no state is functioning at all. But such states are still
comprised of the components of sovereignty described here. After all,
all states evoke different qualities and strengths of allegiance, and all
states function with different levels of efficiency. Just because a given
state is not able to monitor a given border or provide given services
does not mean that the above components of sovereignty do not exist.
Take the Central African Republic, for example. There, the subjective
relationship between the people and the state is often one of
tremendous expectation by the people; the people believe that the state
should be providing for them in ways that it is not doing. As such, the
people experience the world through the organizational structure of the
state, even as their beliefs in the state in many ways exceed the state's
capacities. Meanwhile, the state's failure to fully manage borders or to
otherwise regulate domestically simply evidences a lack of efficiency.
Even though something like cross-border commerce might be taking
place completely outside of the involvement of the state, the
expectation-by not only locals but also by the international
community-is that this area of regulation is within the purview of the
state. 165 In other words, part of the point is that the functional aspects

165. Similarly, there is no question that illicit trade-in drugs and beyond-takes
place across U.S. borders, outside the reach of U.S. government authorities. See, e.g.,
Richard P6rez-Pefia, Drug-Smuggling Tunnel, Found in San Diego, Is Longest Yet, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/us/drug-smuggling-tunnelfrom-tijuana-mexico-found-in-san-diego.html
(subscription
required)
[https:/perma.cc/ST9U-W2NF] (archived Sept. 7, 2016) ("For all the talk about a wall
between the United States and Mexico, the problem with border security continues to be
as much below ground as above. On Wednesday, officials in San Diego announced the
discovery of another cross-border tunnel built by drug smugglers - the longest one found
yet, at about half a mile.... Despite the superlatives cited by officials, the cat-and-mole
game between law enforcement and drug cartels shows no sign of abating. In the last
five years, the authorities said, they have found more than 75 cross-border tunnels ....
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of sovereignty are in part constructed; there is nothing a priori about
them. States could be modeled differently, but they are not. States are
imagined-indeed, required-to be modeled a certain way so that the
global market can function in the way that it happens to function. The
fact that states like the Central African Republic are commonly
referred to as "failed states" only confirms this-what this phrase
means is not that the Central African Republic is somehow something
different from a state, a different genre of entity, but only that it is not
operating at the full level of efficiency expected of it as exactly what it
166
is, a sovereign state.
V. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND CONVENTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY HAS
CEASED TO EXIST

The term "sovereignty" is a Western invention. The hegemony of
its Western-born meaning influences the concept on multiple levels. As
such, "[Indigenous] sovereignty" is frequently framed as qualitatively
different and therefore always in opposition to "[conventional/Western]
' 167

sovereignty."

This oppositional framing is problematic for two reasons. First, it
subtly adopts discourses about Western "sovereignty"-for instance,
that sovereignty is equivalent to complete independence-that, as
discussed above, are now inaccurate, if they ever were correct to begin
with. Second, and more importantly, framing Indigenous sovereignty

Specialists on border control say no one has a clear idea how many tunnels are operating,
or how much of a role they play in the drug trade, but they will be a factor for the
foreseeable future."); Lizette Alvarez, In Puerto Rico, Cocaine Gains Access to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/us/in-puerto-rico-cocainegains-access -to-us.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/26JG-H8XX] (archived
Sept. 7, 2016) ("Much of the cocaine being smuggled here now bypasses other
surrounding islands and is taken directly from South America to Puerto Rico, a prized
transshipment hub because it is on United States land. Once inside, packages that
conceal drugs do not need to clear customs .... Gen. John F. Kelly, the leader of the
Southern Command, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee ...that the Coast
Guard and law enforcement are failing to capture an estimated 80 percent of the drugs,
almost all of it cocaine, that are flowing through the Caribbean Sea to the United
States."). Yet, I know of no allegations suggesting that such trade means that the United
States is not sovereign.
166. I owe my critical insight and background information about the Central
African Republic to conversations with Louisa Lombard, PhD, who wrote her
dissertation on that country, including issues of sovereignty. See generally Louisa
Lombard & Sylvain Batianga-Kinzi, Violence, Popular Punishment, and War in the
CentralAfrican Republic, 114 AFR. AFF.52 (2014).
167. E.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 178; see generally Menno Boldt & J. Anthony
Long, Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of
Canada'sNative Indians, XVII CAN. J. POL. SCI. 537 (1984) (arguing that "sovereignty"
is a double-edged sword).

1104

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.49.1045

in opposition to Western sovereignty continuously discredits
Indigenous sovereignty as always already (in Althusserian terms) after
Western sovereignty. That is to say, where a distinction is made
between "Indigenous sovereignty" and "conventional sovereignty," it
tends to be because the former is seeking to become the latter, and, in
this way, conventional sovereignty appears always as the preferableand therefore superior-form.
But today, for the first time in history, the distinction between
Indigenous sovereignty and conventional sovereignty has ceased to
exist. That is, the framework for both is the same, being a framework
that must include interactions between groups and that must still be
able to account for how each group itself understands and experiences
that "sovereignty." For this reason, the model proposed here is nonprescriptive: it accounts for the function of sovereignty while still
reflecting the essential fact that any group will organize itself, and
understand itself, in any way it sees fit.
Nevertheless, I predict at least three particular avenues of
critique to this model of sovereignty in general, and to this conjoining
of Indigenous and conventional sovereignty in particular. First, critics
might say that the model overestimates the link between capital flow
and culture; in harsher terms, the model might be called capitalist or
imperialist or both. "Capital is the problem," this critique would argue,
"whereas you claim it as some kind of solution. Shame on you!" In
response I say that my model is one that is proposed not as an ideal,
but rather as a true reflection of the state of the world as we live it
today. I agree that better worlds are possible, desirable, and that we
all have an obligation to work towards them on behalf of all peoples;
but, in the current moment-as short or long as future history may
prove it to be-a refusal to recognize the significant role of capital
regulation in the management of culture can only weaken the ability
of any group to protect that culture. This Article expresses no opinion
whatsoever on how a given group should regulate its cross-border
capital; it does not suggest that any specific cultural traits are more
worthy of protection than others nor does it propose any particular
pathway of action. Rather, the Article stands for the proposition that
to understand the inextricable relationship between sovereignty,
culture, and the legal regulation of capital is to gain tools of
empowerment (even recognizing the harsh and, at times, brutal
realities of contemporary globalization).
Second, one might contend that this model, by some sleight of
hand, attempts to erase all that is unique about Indigenous peoples
more broadly, and about Indigenous conceptions of sovereignty more
precisely. It does not. There is, with perhaps only extremely minor
exception, no group on the planet today that does not wish to engage
with the global market, that is, to obtain at least some global goods. As
such, sovereignty for all groups hinges on relationships with other
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sovereignties and must therefore be founded on the management of
those relationships, whether by invitation or resistance. Furthermore,
I refuse the temptation to romanticize Indigenous groups by suggesting
that they are not interested in goods and other products of the global
market.
Third and finally, by relying so heavily on the Cook Islands for
evidence, some might accuse this Article of bias, too narrow a focus, or
unawareness of the real differences among the peoples of the world. As
noted, however, this Article offers a model. The model is purposefully
designed to allow for differences among people. The evidence here from
the Cook Islands is an example-it demonstrates one articulation of
the principles here suggested; these same principles are equally
reflected in articulations of sovereignty from all other locations across
the planet. I encourage comparative research in this area.
There are, no doubt, other worthy critiques. But I stand by these
four simple and significant points: First, every group on the planetwhether conventional nation-state or Indigenous group-engages with
the global market because at least some of its members want to obtain
manufactured goods from other groups. Second, in order to engage with
the global market, every group-whether conventional nation-state or
Indigenous group-must make sacrifices; that is, although the basic
trading of goods and services still takes place, the acquisition of
manufactured goods requires a group to make some compromises, to
sacrifice something, typically to provide for foreign investment, in
order to generate the wealth to obtain those goods. Third, different
groups are willing to sacrifice different things; in each instance, what
a group is willing to sacrifice depends on what that group considers to
be most valuable. 168 Fourth, because each type of regulation that
affects cross-border capital jeopardizes some cultural traits while
protecting others, each piece of regulation must be carefully considered
not only for its economic value but also for its cultural consequences.
This works in two directions: when evaluating any regulation that
might impact cross-border capital flow, particular care must be given
to what the cultural consequences may be; likewise, where certain
cultural elements are especially important, all regulation affecting
cross-border capital flow should be assessed with the protection of
those elements as the explicit goal.

168. For instance, Cook Islanders will sacrifice citizenship but not land-holding
rules; the French will sacrifice economic control via the European Union but not the right
to regulate foreign-language signage/advertisements; Swedes will sacrifice Swedishlanguage use but not social welfare payments to its citizens; et cetera.
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article approached these topics through the combined lenses
of law and anthropology. To be sure, there is much to be said about
sovereignty and globalization from the point of view of the discipline of
law itself; the same is true of the viewpoints of economics and political
science, which tend to be the disciplines that law is most influenced by.
But here, the contributions of anthropology are crucial.
Together then, law and anthropology provide excellent
collaborative tools for investigating the contemporary processes of
sovereignty and globalization. As described above, sovereignty is in
part made up of a subjective component referred to as emotional
sovereignty. 169 This is because sovereignty has different meanings for
different peoples. And this emotional component is indispensable to a
broader definition of sovereignty because it is impossible to understand
the functional/instrumental aspects of sovereignty without it. People
live sovereignty and people believe in sovereignty; why else would
people be willing to die for their countries? Why else would Indigenous
peoples and others around the world be demanding sovereignty?
Sovereignty is valued, although valued differently and for different
reasons by different people.
So, any model that does not recognize the subjective component of
sovereignty must be faulty. After all, it seems silly to suggest that
sovereignty means the same thing for Americans as it does for the
French, the Maori, the Chinese, or the Cherokee. It is likewise clear
that the ways that these groups manage their sovereignty
domestically-the ways they run their groups internally-are all
remarkably different.
By contrast, other aspects of sovereignty are nearly identical in
regard to every nation-state and Indigenous group. This is because, as
noted, no group exists in a vacuum. Instead, all states are
interconnected in the matrix of global commerce, and all the more so
through the transformations taking place through global value chains.
In order for this to be possible, all states must function in the same
way: they must serve as an interface mechanism with other states and
they must function similarly so that the interfaces can work. In other
words, they must set up the conditions of law that make commerce
possible between and among the various states of the planet. This
functioning, again, is continuously influenced by the group's emotional,
subjective views on what is important and on what the state is and
should be.

169. See supra Section IV.B.
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A comprehensive model of sovereignty must then incorporate all
of these various aspects of what sovereignty is and how it functions. In
this myriad of different ways, globalization, sovereignty, law, and
capital all come together; in the contemporary era, each is inextricable
from the other, creating a system. Some states and some cultures fare
well in this system, others fare poorly. The system nevertheless makes
clear that legal scholarship must take better account of these
relationships-not just individually, but as a whole. Further, these
conclusions are not simply theoretical niceties. Rather, an
understanding of these systemic relationships empowers the policymakers of conventional states and Indigenous groups alike not just to
manage capital flow, but also to be able to do so in ways that more
explicitly, efficiently, and effectively integrate different forms of
value-both economic and social.

